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This research investigates the auditor’s role in auditing the “other information in annual 
reports and attempts to address the significant gap in knowledge on auditors’ role in auditing 
“other information”. In particular, this research tries to better understand the following: 1) the 
auditor’s role and responsibilities for the “other information” while auditing financial 
statements; 2) how ISA 720, both current and revised versions, affect current practice and the 
challenges it brings; and 3) to further understand the audit performance-expectation gap, 
specifically, the performance gap identified Porter (1993). Nine interviews were conducted 
with senior audit professionals who provided the basis for the findings. The interviews were 
recorded, transcribed, managed and analysed with the use of NVivo 11. The findings confirm 
the subjectivity within ISA 720 The Auditor’s Responsibilities Relating to Other Information 
in Documents Containing Audited Financial Statements. This research also reveals the 
challenges auditors face in balancing the expectations of society and the practicalities of 
working at the margins of their professional judgement and knowledge. Ultimately, the 
findings will be applicable to practice, policy-makers, current literature and theory, by 
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Chapter 1 – Introduction  
1.1 Overview 
 The role of the auditor continues to expand in scope and complexity as stakeholder 
demands for improved corporate accountability grow (Hooks, Coy, & Davy, 2002). In 2005, 
the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) issued its discussion paper 
Management Commentary (IASB, 2005) and proposed that entities should disclose 
information on the nature of the business, objectives, strategies, key resources, risk and 
relationships, results and prospects and performance measures and indicators. Much of these 
aspects are in the form of narratives and some opine that the narrative section is the most 
important part of the annual report (Canniffe, 2003). Examples of narratives include the Chief 
Executive Officer’s (CEO) statement, Management Discussion and Analysis (MD&A), and 
other written representations about the operations of the entity. Brazel, Jones, and Zimbelman 
(2009) observed that when unaudited non-financial measures are inconsistent with financial 
statement information, the likelihood of fraud is higher. Their results suggest that auditors 
should pay attention to the information in annual reports in other types of regulatory filings 
that could be inconsistent with the audited financial statements. Bedard, Sutton, Arnold, and 
Phillips (2012) observed that investors, professional and nonprofessional, use certain 
information categories more often when they believe that the information has been audited. 
Furthermore, the responses of both investor groups, concerning whether currently unaudited 
information categories should be audited, suggest an unmet demand for greater assurance 
concerning information outside of the financial statements. 
 The applicable auditing standard which tries to align users’ expectations with 
auditors’ responsibilities to non-financial information is International Auditing Standard 
(ISA) 720 The Auditor’s Responsibilities Relating to Other Information in Documents 
Containing Audited Financial Statements. ISA 720 refers to any information presented 
alongside the financial statements and notes as the “other information” (see paragraph 5(a)) 
and, among other things, could comprise of a report by management, financial summaries or 
highlights, financial ratios and planned capital expenditures (see paragraph A3). In an audit, 
the auditor will know the financial results reported in the financial statements at the time of 
evaluating the “other information” as this evaluation occurs towards the end of the audit. This 
puts auditors in a prime position to carefully review and substantiate the claims management 
make in the “other information”. The auditor will need to assess whether the “other 
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information” is consistent with the audited financial statements. If the auditor finds that the 
“other information” is inconsistent, then the auditor can respond according to the 
requirements of ISA 720. Notwithstanding this, the audit report opinion does not provide 
specific assurance on the “other information” and it is unclear whether general financial 
statement users (i.e., individuals who use financial accounting information to make rational 
investment, credit, and similar decisions) are aware of this, thereby, giving rise to an 
expectations gap (Porter, Ó hÓgartaigh, & Basherville, 2012) – a gap between society’s 
expectations of auditors and auditors’ actual performance as perceived by society (Porter, 
1993). 
 However, little is known about how auditors consider the “other information” in 
current practice and to what extent auditors are attentive in reviewing such information to 
ensure it is consistent with firms’ actual performance. Professor Schilder, Chairman of the 
International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB) stated: 
Non-financial information should not be knowingly associated with false or 
misleading statement[s], and it should be aligned with financial reporting 
[EY, 2004, p. 3]. 
 Clatworthy and Jones (2006) noted that while an audit firm they contacted, read the 
“other information” to ensure the that numbers are reconcilable with the audited financial 
statements, the firm has no specific guidance on how auditors’ should consider narratives, 
thus, giving rise to subjectivity [see their footnote 2]. In addition, Deloitte (IASB, 2006) 
argues that the “other information” is likely to “be so subjective as to require auditors to 
modify their reports on the grounds of fundamental uncertainty or limitation of scope…” 
(IASB, 2006, p.5). Thus, whether relevant standards are effectively guiding auditors is 
unclear. More recently, in August, the IAASB released a discussion paper on supporting the 
credibility and trust in emerging forms of external reporting (IAASB, 2016). It clarifies the 
demand for credibility and trust with emerging external reports. It also raises the question of 
how can the auditing profession meet this demand. Thus, the purpose of this study is to 
investigate the auditor’s role in auditing the “other information” in annual reports. In 
addition, this research makes a timely and meaningful contribution to the IAASB.  
1.2 Motivation and contributions of this study 
 Very little is known about how auditors consider the “other information” during the 
audit of financial statements. There are questions surrounding the application of ISA 720 due 
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to the level of judgement and subjectivity involved (Clatworthy & Jones, 2006). This is of 
concern as users have been attaching increasing value to narrative information as they look 
for better ways to inform their analysis and understanding of the more complex areas in the 
financial statements. Narrative information, if not “true and fair” may result in capital 
misallocations (Merkl-Davies, Brennan, & McLeay, 2007).  
 The rapidly changing nature of today’s financial reporting environment, may mean 
the auditing profession and its standards are lagging in identifying and responding to 
changing public expectations (Tricker, 1980). For example, Fisher and Naylor (2016) 
investigated the auditor’s role and responsibilities concerning Internet Financial Reporting 
(IFR) and found that due to the rapid advancement of reporting practices, auditing 
pronouncements are struggling to keep pace. Consequently, the emergence of an audit 
expectations gap is seen between users and preparers of online reports and the auditors of 
those reports (Fisher & Naylor, 2016). Furthermore, the emergence of Integrated Reporting 
will further exacerbate many of the concerns auditors are currently facing. This will draw 
criticisms to the auditing profession if they do not meet society’s expectations.  
 This research will provide a more transparent picture of the current role and practice 
of auditors on the broad issue of their responsibilities regarding the “other information”. 
Interview evidence from this study should, therefore, be of significance to the accountancy 
profession in its deliberations on how effective current standards are for the review of “other 
information”.  
 The research approach to this study is qualitative in nature. A number of authors are 
in agreement about the value and importance of qualitative research into aspects of audit 
practice. Hopwood (1996) observe that much of audit practice remains as a “black box”. 
Beattie, Brandt and Fearnley (2001) and Power (2003) agree that the study of auditing in 
action is lacking. This then, prompted Humphrey (2008) to strongly encourage research 
which seeks “to bridge a gap and enhance the understanding of the practical realities of audit 
practice” (p. 172); and how “such practices relate to, influence and are influenced by, broader 
social, organisation and regulatory contexts” (p. 185). This study aims to answer some of the 
concerns raised by Humphrey (2008). 
 The specific contributions of this paper can be grouped into three categories: 
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1. Policy: this research will aid policy makers in understanding the effectiveness of the 
standard overseeing auditors’ responsibilities relating to the “other information”. This 
will contribute to future development in standards and guidance regarding the “other 
information”; 
2. Practice: this research will provide a clearer picture of an auditors’ role and practices 
as perceived by auditors themselves, providing a basis for individual audit firms and 
the audit profession to evaluate their performance; and 
3. Theory: this research will contribute to further understanding of the implications that 
auditor’s work on “other information” will have on the audit expectations gap (Porter, 
1993). In addition, the study will provide future directions for research in this 
important, but neglected area.  
1.3 Structure of thesis 
 The structure of this thesis is structured as follows: Chapter 2 reviews the literature on 
the “other information”, ISA 720, the audit expectation gap and identifies the knowledge 
gaps. This also forms the basis for the research questions. Chapter 3 explains the research 
methodology and methods used in collecting and analysing the research evidence. Chapter 4 
analyses and interprets the findings to answer the research questions. Chapter 5 analyses and 
discusses the findings. The thesis then concludes with chapter 6, which discusses the 
contributions of the research evidence to current literature, theory, practice and policy; a 




Chapter 2 – Literature review 
 The previous chapter provided an overview to the current study and outlined its 
motivation and contributions. The aim of this chapter is to summarise relevant literature to 
identify gaps in our knowledge, thus forming the basis for the development of the research 
questions underpinning this research. This chapter reviews three aspects of literature: 1) 
narratives; 2) ISA 720; and 3) the audit expectation gap. A review of narratives and ISA 720 
will identify the knowledge gaps surrounding the auditor’s roles and responsibilities with 
respect to the “other information”. A review of the audit expectations gap will assist in 
providing analytical framework with which the results can be interpreted. To conclude, the 
research questions will be outlined.  
2.1 Narratives 
 Narratives in annual reports are “generally considered to be one of the most important 
sources of corporate information” (Botosan, 1997, p. 331). Clatworthy and Jones (2003) and 
Beattie, McInnes, and Fearnley (2004) highlight the importance of accounting narratives. 
Percy (1999) observes that although financial statements once fulfilled all the information 
needs of stockholders and stakeholders, there is now a push towards including more narrative 
information. This is emphasised by regulatory authorities, both in the USA and UK, such as 
the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC), who mandated the management discussion and 
analysis (MD&A) in 1980 (SEC, 2002). Its purpose is to provide a narrative explanation 
“through the eyes of management” of how the entity has performed in the past, its current 
financial position, and its future prospects. In the UK, the Accounting Standards Board 
(ASB) produced the Operating Financial Review (OFR) in 1993. The OFR is to provide an 
“objective discussion that analyses and explains the main features underlying the results and 
financial position”, due to the growing complexities of businesses. Beattie and Jones (1992) 
found that 149 out of 189 (79 percent) used graphs to display some sort of information in 
their annual reports. Notably, the chairman’s statement is the most widely read and useful 
aspect in the annual report (Lee & Tweedie, 1976; Harte, Lewis, & Owen, 1991; Clatworthy 
& Jones, 2006). 
 Prior research on narratives demonstrates that they are useful for predicting future 
financial performance (Beynon & Jones, 2004; Bryan, 1997) and bankruptcy (Tennyson et 
al., 1990; Smith & Taffler, 1995, 2000). Therefore, it is important that the narrative 
information conveyed to users reflects financial reality. Commentators have raised doubts 
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about the harmony of the two parts. The financial statements are audited and as such, are 
submitted to a form of control (generally accepted accounting principles); whereas the 
narratives offer a “blank canvas” for management and are not regulated. This asymmetry of 
information between management and users (as described by Jensen and Mackling, 1976; 
Ingram & Frazier, 1983) opens the possibility for manipulation or obfuscation of information 
(Deegan & Gordon, 1996; Jones, 2011) and impression management. Impression 
management is described as an attempt to present a more positive take on the company’s 
performance and position than is merited (Beattie & Jones, 2008). This may potentially result 
in conflicting messages being given in the narratives relative to what is expressed in the 
audited financial statements (Abrahamson & Amir, 1996; Smith & Taffler, 1995). This will 
impair the quality of financial reporting and possibly result in capital misallocations (Merkl-
Davies et al., 2007). 
 In brief, narratives have emerged as an important and integral part of corporate 
reporting and will still assume a greater degree of significance into the future. Henderson 
(2004) claimed that narratives in annual reports are more important than the financial 
statements, and that investors were more likely to read the narratives over the financial 
statements. Authors have observed an increase in reliance on narratives by users, hence the 
increased pressure to ensure transparency for the sake of unsophisticated users (Rutherford, 
2003, Beattie and Jones, 2002). Therefore, it is critical to examine the narrative sections of 
the annual report as they contain important information which shareholders and stakeholders 
use to make decisions. In fact, very often this information is relied on in preference to data in 
the financial sections of the report (Henderson, 2004; Canniffe, 2003; Bartlett and Chandler, 
1997). The next section will discuss in detail three prominent sections in an annual report that 
may potentially be part of “other information: 1) the chairman’s statement; 2) MD&A; and 3) 
visuals. It will also discuss two emerging developments surrounding the annual report: web 
documents and integrated reporting. The next section reviews the chairman’s statement. 
2.1.1 Chairman’s statement 
 The chairman’s statement (or its equivalent the president’s letter) is an almost 
universally read component of an annual report (Clatworthy & Jones, 2006; Smith & Taffler, 
1992) and is a source of “useful information about the future of the company” (Abrahamson 
& Amir 1996, p. 1179). Bartlett and Chandler (1997) and Beattie and Pratt (2002) found that, 
out of 17 sections in an annual report, the chairman’s statement is most thoroughly read with 
48% readership, and was ranked second in overall importance by private shareholders. 
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Empirical research conducted in the United States has shown that the both inclusion and the 
content of the president’s letters significantly affect the judgements on share prices in equity 
investment decisions (Shanton et al., 2004). Furthermore, Smith and Taffler (2000) find the 
chairman’s statement is highly associated with the indication of firm failure.  
 While it can, in principle, be used to convey important strategic information to 
readers, studies that have content analysed chairmen’s statements have found that they can be 
used for conveying biased content or messages that are ambiguous in terms of the future 
prospects of the business. Aerts (1994) identifies the chairman’s statement as providing an 
opportunity for companies to make “systematically biased” (p. 341) statements and manage 
news disclosures in the company’s favour. In a later study, Aerts (2005) refers to this as a 
“self-serving attributional bias” — a form of impression-management companies use to 
manipulate audiences with respect to a particular interpretation of events. Clatworthy and 
Jones (2006) looked into poorly performing companies who engaged in impression 
management and found that companies doing poorly tend to concentrate on the future rather 
than reporting on the past, which confirms that the chairman’s statement is subject to 
impression management.  
 The usefulness of the chairman’s statement perceived by report users reinforces the 
importance disclosures have in the association with the future of the company (Smith & 
Taffler, 2000). Currently, the chairman’s statement is not audited but is subject to scrutiny 
from auditors (Bettman and Weitz, 1983) to be accurate and honest. Additionally, the scope 
and nature of the chairman’s statement constrains it to discuss the firm’s achievements and 
disappointments, results for the current period, future expectations and predictions (Staw et 
al., 1983). As a result of the chairman’s perceived usefulness and the reliance held by users, 
there are calls for this “other information” to be audited (Clatworthy & Jones, 2006). The 
next section reviews the MD&A. At the moment, they are only subject to a review by the 
auditor and do not provide an opinion on the “other information” in the auditor’s report.  
2.1.2 MD&A 
 The purpose of the MD&A is to provide a narrative explanation “through the eyes of 
management” (SEC, 2003), information necessary in understanding the entity’s past 
performance, its current financial condition, and its future prospects (SEC, 2003). In the 
process, the MD&A provides users incremental information, beyond the financial statements, 
in assessing the firms future prospects (Bryan, 1997), and provides the transparency of 
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financial information (Rogers & Grant, 1997; Tavcar, 1998). To stress its importance, in the 
US, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) mandated the MD&A in 1980 (SEC, 
2003). In the UK, the Accounting Standards Board, proposed the Operating Financial Review 
(OFR) which should complement as well as supplement the financial statements to enhance 
the overall corporate disclosure. The statutory OFR was unexpectedly replaced in November 
2005 by a lesser requirement for an “Enhanced Business Review” (EBR). Consequently, the 
EBR is mean to be ‘less prescriptive’ and ‘more flexible’ relative to the OFR and requires the 
review to extend into information on environmental, employment, social and community 
issues and forward-looking information (ICAEW, 2016).  
 Epstein and Palepu (1999) observed that financial analysts and users are more 
dependent on the MD&A content when making forecasts than they are on the financial 
statements and that it provides incremental information to the markets beyond earnings 
(Bryan 1997; Clarkson, Kao, & Richardson, 1999; Francis, Jones & Cole, 2005). Epstein and 
Pava (1995) observed that MD&A are read and used more by inexperienced users. 
Furthermore, Sutton, Arnold, Bedard, & Phillips (2010) and Arnold, Bedard, Phillips, & 
Sutton (2011) found that nonprofessional investors who are more inclined to favour using the 
MD&A over footnote information, are more likely to use MD&A information if they think it 
has been audited. Furthermore, nonprofessional investors appear to read financial information 
in the order in which it is presented (Bouwman, 1982, Maines & McDaniel, 2000). With the 
MD&A being presented before the financial statements in an annual report, nonprofessional 
investors will probably interpret information about the entity from the outset. Thus, 
suggesting that users place a greater importance on the information that is presented before 
the financial statements  
 Bedard et al., (2012) revealed that investors are generally unable to differentiate the 
levels of assurance associated with financial statements versus MD&A disclosures. Adding to 
the misunderstanding, Libby, Nelson, and Hunton (2006) find that auditors tend to allow 
greater magnitudes of misstatements in different parts of the annual report. Specifically, 
Libby et al., (2006) observed that auditors tolerated greater misstatements in disclosed 
information (i.e., footnotes) as opposed to recognised information (i.e., financial statements). 
This is of concern, as the “other information” may not be consistent with the audited financial 
statements and result in a “mismatch” of information, thereby hindering reporting quality. 
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 Like the chairman’s statement, they are currently not audited. Although, there have 
been calls for greater auditor involvement with MD&A disclosures (Wheeler, Cereola, & 
Louwers, 2014; Bedard et al., 2012) due to the importance, reliance and the ability the 
MD&A has in the understanding of the entity’s position. Bedard et al., (2012) suggests there 
is an unmet demand for the audit of MD&A.  
2.1.3 Visuals 
 The presentation of financial information may be achieved using more than just 
figures and statements. Graphs are popularly used in annual reports as they help facilitate the 
users’ understanding and perception of the entity and its financial health (Jones, 2011; 
Holmes, 1984) and used to highlight or summarise important trends (Steinbart, 1989). They 
are particularly more “user friendly” than tables, have the ability to attract the reader’s 
attention and are more likely to be remembered (Beattie and Jones, 1997; Pavio, 1974). 
International research has shown that the use of graphs in annual reports is widespread, with 
in excess of 80% of companies found to be using graphs to present some form of information 
(Beattie & Jones, 1992, 2000, 2002).  
 However, Jones (2011) and Beattie and Jones (1997) identified a number of ways 
graphs could mislead users: 1) selectivity; 2) measurement distortion; and 3) presentational 
enhancement (see Jones, 2011). Selectivity involves management deliberately choosing 
certain factors that will result in a favourable impression of the company; for example, 
selecting certain time periods where there is a positive correlation. Measurement distortion 
occurs when the graph’s physical dimensions do not accurately reflect the underlying 
numerical data; for example, where the y-axis does not start at zero. This may result in an 
exaggeration of performance or a declining trend being understated. Presentational 
enhancement is where a particular aspect of the graph is given prominence; for example, 
prominence is given to emphasise a certain figure. The current literature on the use of graphs 
has documented impression management as the incentive to enhance the company’s image 
(see Beattie & Jones, 2008). 
 Graphs can be used either to aid understanding or potentially to mislead the viewer 
and Arunachalam, Pei, & Steinbart (2002) confirmed that the decision-making process could 
be influenced by manipulated graphs when integrated with numerical information. They are 
accurate to the extent to which they lead the viewer to form conclusions consistent with those 
that would result from a quantitative analysis of the data (Steinbart, 1989). Therefore, it is 
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important to ensure that the graphs depicted in an annual report accurately reflect the 
information in the audited financial statements. It is currently not known whether or how 
auditors consider graphs in their assessment of the “other information”. Steinbart (1989) 
concluded that additional guidance is needed to assist auditors in determining when “other 
information” is presented in a manner that is materially inconsistent with the financial 
statements. Beattie and Jones (1997) recognised the need for accounting and auditing 
guidelines addressing the preparation and presentation of graphs. 
2.2 Web documents 
 The internet has emerged as a more direct and faster way to reach stakeholders than 
traditional hard-copy disclosures (Fisher, Oyelere, & Laswad, 2004) and numerous 
companies around the world have been engaging in the use of Internet financial reporting 
(IFR). The benefits associated with IFR have been well documented and include: 1) improved 
cost efficiency; and 2) improved user access to information (see Fisher et al., 2004). IFR is 
still voluntary in most countries with the lack of regulation and rules to govern such 
disclosure practices. Consequently, problems with IFR arise and include: 1) information 
overload; 2) information quality; and 3) security (Jones & Xiao, 2004). On information 
overload, Groves (1994) reviews 25 large US company reports and is concerned that the 
sheer quantity of financial disclosure diminishes its value. This is not surprising because of 
its virtually unlimited capacity (Trites, 1999). Problems with information quality are two-
fold: data integrity and auditability. Integrity refers to out-of-date information (Hussey 
Gulliford, & Lymer, 1998); misleading through hyperlinking (Trites, 1999), or selectivity 
(Gowthorpe & Flynn, 1997). Auditability refers to the ambiguity of whether certain financial 
information has been subject to an audit (Hussey et al., 1998). Last, the likelihood of security 
breaches such as unwarranted third party interventions (Hussey et al., 1998).  
 Hodge (2001) notes a potential issue for IAS 720 when looking at audited financial 
statements that are hyperlinked to unaudited information on the internet. He showed that the 
participants misclassified hyperlinked unaudited information as audited. The participants also 
rated the credibility of accompanying hyperlinked unaudited information as higher than 
subjects viewing hard copies of the unaudited information. This confusion about the 
responsibility of the auditor with respect to web-based accounting reports has existed since 
the inception of Internet financial reporting (Archambault & Gibson, 1999). 
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 The extent of an auditor’s effort in performing the audit examination varies on the 
basis of current practices, auditing standards, and the auditing environment. ISA 720 does not 
consider web documents as part of “other information” which implies that auditors are not 
required to read such information (see ISA 720, paragraph A4). The disclosures made may 
then be easily misused and create a demand for auditing services with respect to web 
documents (Wagenhofer, 2003). Fisher and Naylor (2016) and Bedard et al., (2012) also 
provide strong evidence of an unmet demand for auditing corporate website information. 
2.3 Integrated reporting  
 Integrated reporting (IR) marked a potential landmark development in the evolution 
of corporate reporting. It is a new reporting paradigm which encourages companies to bring 
together financial, environmental, social and governance information to enable interested 
stakeholders to provide a holistic account of companies’ performances. It was developed in 
response to growing stakeholder demand for a broader range of decision-useful information 
(Busco, Frigo, Riccaboni & Quattrone, 2013). More importantly, IR aims to offer a long-term 
view and the sustainability of an organisation’s operations; a shortfall in the current reporting 
paradigm. Contributing to the momentum, South Africa mandated IR for listed companies on 
the Johannesburg Stock Exchange. 
 Hanks and Gardiner (2013) recognised the interrelationship between financial 
stability and environmental and social sustainability. As a result, this presents the need for 
greater integration between financial and non-financial information, present and future-
oriented data, in a concise, clearly expressed, consistent and comparable report (Eccles and 
Krzus, 2010). However, in producing IR, Wild and van Staden (2013) find them lengthy, 
with a majority (69 percent) between 100 and 250 pages long. However, critical information 
may be overlooked due to the length of an IR and the growth in the quantity of non-financial 
information does not correlate with a high standard of quality in the information (Wild & van 
Staden, 2013). This is not surprising given the voluntary nature of the “other information”. 
With the expansion in the amount of disclosures to be reported, it raises serious concerns for 
auditors as to the scope of information that is considered as the “other information” and 
thereby, reviewed.  
 In brief, the amount of disclosures is going to increase and the distinction between 
what is to be audited and what is not will be blurred. This new paradigm of corporate 
reporting will amplify existing issues concerning auditors’ roles and responsibilities with 
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respect to the “other information”. Auditors may then have different views and interpretations 
about which of the companies’ reported information constitutes the ISA 720 “other 
information” in the specific client circumstances. This could this lead to inconsistency in 
practice and a widening of the expectation gap about the nature and extent of the auditor’s 
work. 
 To summarise, annual reports include more information, both financial and non-
financial, present management with the opportunity to explore ways to better integrate 
financial statement information and the “other information” to reflect their financial 
performance and position. Users have been attaching greater importance to the “other 
information” in an entity’s annual report that is not scrutinised as closely as the financial 
statements by independent auditors (Ingram & Frazier, 1983). As such, management has 
freedom in determining the contents of their narratives and with the lack of objectivity this 
raises concerns about the validity of the “other information”. As a result, there is significant 
demand for at least some degree of assurance on the “other information”. The next section 
will review (current and revised) ISA 720 which outlines the requirements of auditors 
pertaining to the “other information”. 
2.4 ISA 720 
 ISA 720 was promulgated in 2000 by the IAASB, following the American experience 
in issuing Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 8 by the American Institute of 
Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) in 1975. SAS No. 8 was then codified into SAS No. 
118 and subsequently AU Section 550 as a result from the Clarification and Convergence 
Project of the Auditing Standards Board in 2010 to address practice issues (AICPA, 2015). In 
addition, the Accounting Standards Board (ASB) in the United States of America also 
converged the standards with the ISAs issued by the IAASB. Thus, AU Section 550 was 
redesigned as AU-C Section 720 Other Information in Document Containing Audited 
Financial Statements (AICPA, 2015). With regard to New Zealand’s auditing standards, prior 
to adopting the ISAs  in 2005, the standard overseeing auditors’ responsibilities concerning 
the “other information” was AS-518 Other Information in a Document Containing an 
Audited Financial Report (NZICA, 2010). In implementing the ISAs in New Zealand, 
additions, deletions, or other amendments to the extent permitted by the IAASB was required. 
However, in adopting ISA 720 which became ISA (NZ), there was no change in scope or 




 In undergoing numerous revisions of the standard (SAS No. 8, SAS No. 118, AU 
Section 550, and AU-C Section 720) suggests that the AICPA acknowledged the changing 
environment of corporate reporting and revised the standard to meet society’s expectations. 
The IAASB also acknowledged the rapid changing landscape of corporate reporting. Hence, 
the stated purpose of ISA 720 was to “serve the public interest” by ensuring that there is an 
appropriate auditor response in the event the other information could undermine the 
credibility of the audited financial statements and the auditor’s report (IAASB, 2015). The 
IAASB chairman, Professor Schilder remarked: 
The annual report is a critical document for investors. It is in the public interest 
that an auditor undertakes an ‘intelligent read’ of an annual report, in the context 
of the knowledge obtained in the audit, and perform certain procedures to ensure 
the annual report is not materially inconsistent with the audited financial 
statements  
[IFAC, 2015, p. 1]. 
 Developments in narrative reporting have shown a clear demand for assurance and are 
seen as value-adding. The IASB (2005) Management Commentary suggests the need to 
investigate the assurance on the “other information” because of users’ evolving assurance 
needs as discussed in the above sections. However, the attitude of the UK auditing profession 
to provide assurance on the “other information” has been extremely cautious as they argued 
that the role of auditors should be limited to a consistency check as: 
[T]he type of work required to make any judgement on the adequacy of the OFR 
is of quite a different type to that normally carried out retrospectively in an 
audit… it is also aiming at a much wider set of inputs to the process… some of 
which may lie outside the auditors’ competence to comment upon…  
[ICAS, 2004]. 
 In agreement, the IAASB also reflects a cautious take and the recently revised ISA 
720 (IAASB, 2009) continues to mandate a consistency approach by requiring auditors to 
read the “other information” in order to identify material inconsistencies with the audited 
financial statements. If the current ISA 720 is taken literally, the auditor’s responsibility 
extends only to what is said in the “other information” and not to what is not said. This raises 
questions of whether auditors address the completeness of “other information” when applying 
the provisions of the ISA 720. The standard itself is not very specific and had been 




 In 2012, the IAASB issued an exposure draft on the revision of ISA 720 as part of 
their Strategy and Work Program 2009–2011 to better reflect today’s financial reporting 
environment. The initial draft raised several concerns which prompted the IAASB to issue a 
second exposure draft that clarified and refined the scope and what the auditor should do 
when assessing “other information”. The standard was finalised in April 2015 and is effective 
for audits of financial statement periods ending on or after 15 December 2016. The objective 
of the IAASB’s revision of ISA 720 was to ensure that the ISA continues to be capable of 
enhancing the credibility of financial statements (IAASB, 2015) and overwhelming evidence 
of support in strengthening the auditor’s responsibilities with respect to “other information” is 
observed (Simnett & Huggins, 2014). In addition, Dan Montgomery, deputy chair of the 
IAASB stated that: 
There is pressure from regulators and others for auditors to do more to challenge 
the other information, including doing more regarding its consistency with the 
financial statements and the auditor’s knowledge.  
[EY, 2014, p. 3]. 
 These calls have suggested that the profession should review its societal obligations 
and provide assurance that goes beyond purely accounting information. Unwillingness to 
engage with society’s demand may draw criticism to the profession. Furthermore, standard-
setters and the process have faced criticisms in the literature. Sikka (2001) viewed standard-
setters as prejudiced bodies acting in the interest of the few groups embedded in their 
membership of the profession (for example, large professional accounting firms and large 
multi-national companies). The process is seen as being designed to promote the self-interest 
of a few powerful interest groups to the detriment of other interest groups (Sikka, 1992). For 
example, a basis for conclusions prepared by the staff of the IAASB in April 2015, 
acknowledged the general view of arguments arising from the comment letters, however, it is 
seen that some arguments were dismissed and not taken into consideration. This is consistent 
with what Young (2003, 2006) observed. Certain issues have been kept off the agenda and 
real power is exercised in standard-setting when potential issues are kept out of consideration, 
rather than when a party enters the public consultation process (Sikka, 2001). On the other 
hand, Manson and Zaman (1999) felt that auditing firms did have a positive attitude towards 
their greater responsibility for the audit function. 
2.4.1 Comparison of ISA 720 and ISA 720 (revised) 
 To facilitate the understanding of the changes made in the revision of ISA 720 (refer 
to Appendix 1), a brief summary of the significant changes covering the objectives, 
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definitions, and requirements made will be discussed below. References to ISA 720 will 
mean the current standard unless stated otherwise.  
2.4.1.1 Scope 
 The current ISA 720 requires auditor’s responsibilities to extend to the “other 
information” in documents containing audited financial statements (see paragraph 1) which 
refers to annual reports (see paragraph 2). The scope within ISA 720 (revised) has extended 
to recognise that an entity’s annual report may be a single document or a combination of 
documents (see paragraph 1). In addition, ISA 720 (revised) clarifies the duties of an auditor 
concerning the “other information. For example, they explicitly state that the auditor is 
required to read and consider the other information because it may be materially inconsistent 
with the financial statements (see paragraph 3) and that the auditor’s responsibilities under 
ISA 720 does not constitute an assurance engagement (see paragraph 8).  
2.4.1.2 Objective 
 A notable change made in the revision of ISA 720 was the change in its objective. 
ISA 720 requires the auditor to respond accordingly with the ISA 720 in the event of the 
“other information” undermining the credibility of the financial statements and the auditor’s 
report (see paragraph 4). In addition, ISA 720 (revised) makes further references and requires 
the auditor to consider whether a material inconsistency exists between the “other 
information” and the auditor’s knowledge obtained in the audit (see paragraph 11(b)). An 
auditor’s knowledge is highly subjective which leads to different interpretations of what is 
required or expected in the standard which leads to inconsistent practices.  
2.4.1.3 Definitions 
 Two significant changes were made in the definitions within ISA 720. First, ISA 720 
identifies and defines “misstatement of fact” as the “other information” being incorrectly 
misstated or presented, which may undermine the credibility of the financial statements (see 
paragraph 5(c)). This definition of “misstatement of fact” establishes a clear link between the 
“other information” and the audited financial statements. ISA 720 (revised) eliminates this 
definition and may blur this primary connection between the “other information” and audited 
financial statements.  
 Second, ISA 720 (revised) identifies and defines “annual report” while the current 
ISA 720 does not. To the IAASB profession’s credit, the changing landscape of corporate 
reporting is acknowledged. This in light of the fact that reporting practices are diverse 
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depending on the jurisdictions they report from. A read of the definition raises questions as to 
what constitutes an “annual report”. For example, with the emergence of IR, some companies 
title their reports “integrated reports”, while other refer to “integrated annual reports” or just 
simply an “annual report”; and some companies include the full set of financial statements in 
their annual report and some may present summaries or highlights of those statements on 
their website or in other documents outside the annual report. For this reason, an “annual 
report” is defined as a document, or combination of documents prepared by management, 
whether pursuant to law or regulation, to provide shareholders’ and stakeholders’ information 
regarding the entity’s financial results and position as set out in the financial statements (see 
paragraph 12(a)). Consequently, this definition broadens and clarifies the scope of work 
required by auditors.  
2.4.1.4 Requirements 
2.4.1.3.1 Work effort 
 The requirements in ISA 720 (revised) have greatly increased. ISA 720 requires the 
auditor to: 
1. obtain in a timely manner, prior to the date of the auditor’s report, the final 
version of the “other information” (that is, the document(s) comprising the annual 
report) (see paragraph 13(b));  
2. read the “other information” and consider whether a material inconsistency exists 
between the “other information” and the audited financial statements, and the 
auditor’s knowledge obtained in the audit. As the basis for this consideration, the 
auditor is required to compare selected amounts or other items in the “other 
information” with such amounts or other items in the financial statements (see 
paragraph A27); and 
3. remain alert for indications that the “other information” not related to the 
financial statements or the auditor’s knowledge obtained in the audit appears to 
be materially misstated (see paragraph 15).  
 In comparison with ISA 720, work effort has increased as the current standard only 
requires auditors to read the “other information” to identify material inconsistencies, if any, 




 ISA 720 (revised) includes new reporting requirement related to auditor reporting on 
the “other information” which complements the changes arising from the IAASB’s newly 
revised auditor reporting standards which come into effect for audits of financial statements 
for periods ending on or after December 2016. It requires the auditor’s report to include:  
 a statement that management is responsible for the “other information" (see paragraph 
22(a)); 
 an identification of the “other information” obtained prior to the date of the auditor’s 
report (see paragraph 22(b)); 
 a statement saying that the auditor’s opinion does not cover the “other information”, 
and accordingly, that the auditor does not express (or will not express) an audit 
opinion or any form of assurance conclusion thereon (see paragraph 22(c)); and 
 a description of the auditor’s responsibilities relating to reading, considering and 
reporting on the “other information” (see paragraph 22(d)).  
 This enhanced auditor reporting provides transparency by requiring reporting on the 
auditor’s work relating to the “other information”. More importantly, the IAASB has retained 
the concept that the ISA 720 (revised) does not constitute an assurance engagement on the 
“other information” (see paragraph 8). As mentioned earlier, stating the auditor does not 
express an audit opinion concerning the “other information” is a cautious approach taken by 
the IAASB. Furthermore, the IAASB said it was helpful in addressing the risk that an 
expectations gap might arise (IAASB, 2012).  
2.4.1.3.3 Documentation 
 ISA 720 (revised) introduces a documentation requirement which the auditor must 
include in the audit file. These include: 
 procedures performed under this ISA (see paragraph 25(a); and 
 the final version of the “other information” on which the auditor has performed the 
work required by ISA 720 (see paragraph 22(b).  
 The ISA 720 (revised) documentation requirement explicitly links this standard to 
ISA 230 Audit Documentation which requires the documentation of significant professional 
judgements made in reaching conclusions on significant matters (see ISA 230, paragraph 
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8(c)). This was agreed upon with the respondents in the exposure draft to respond to the 
views of regulators of being able to be appropriately inspected or enforced (IAASBb, 2015).  
 In brief, the IAASB revised ISA 720 to ensure that the ISA continues to be capable of 
enhancing the credibility of the financial statements through specifying appropriate 
responsibilities of the auditor with respect to the “other information”. A search of current 
literature on the topic about how auditors audit the “other information” is scant. Thus, 
presents a significant knowledge gap which this research is aiming to fill.   
 The IAASB was conscious of the audit expectation gap arising from auditor’s roles 
and responsibilities concerning the “other information” and stated it was a goal to narrow it. 
The next section discusses the implications of (current and revised) ISA 720 on the audit 
expectation gap.  
2.5 Audit expectation gap 
 Porter (1993) defined the audit expectation gap as a gap between society’s 
expectations of auditors and auditors’ actual performance as perceived by society. Monroe 
and Woodcliff (1995) defines the gap as the difference in perception between auditors and the 
public about the duties and responsibilities of auditors and the messages expressed by audit 
reports. It is the difference between what the public expects from the auditing profession and 
what the profession actually provides (Jennings, Kneer, & Reckers, 1993) (refer to Figure 1 
below).  
 
Figure 1: Audit expectation gap 
 Like Fisher and Naylor (2016), this study utilises Porter’s (1993) audit expectation-
performance gap to provide an analytical framework which adds to its usefulness. Utilising 
this framework allows the identification of specific responsibilities contributing to the 
“performance gap” in particular, the deficient performance and deficient standards 
components to be addressed. These terms are defined in the next subsection.  
 Many explanations have been provided as to the causes of the existence of the 
expectation gap. Tricker (1980) notes that an expectation gap may potentially arise as a result 
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changing and expanding public expectations. For example, Ernst and Young (2014) found 
that fund managers used nonfinancial performance measures to aide in their decision-making 
and in this regard, the public requested the expansion of assurance to cover not just the 
financial measures, but also the entire scorecard of an organisation.  
 According to Gaa (1991), the expectation gap is a direct fallout from the political 
game between two contending parties: the public and the auditors. This is supported by 
Sikka, Puxty, Willott and Cooper (1998) who argued that it is within historical and political 
contexts that expectations are formed and transformed. They assert that audit, as a social 
practice, is subject to a constant shifting in meaning because the social context of auditing 
changes continuously as a result of interaction and negotiation. They conclude that the audit 
expectation gap will continue to exist and change over time. Another reason for the gap 
identified by Porter and Gowthorpe (2004) is the unreasonable expectations and a 
misunderstanding of the role of the auditors by users of audited statements. The next section 
will identify the components of the audit expectation gap. 
2.5.1 Components of the audit expectation-performance gap 
 Initially, it was argued that the gap was because of the unreasonableness of society’s 
expectations (Fadzly & Ahmad, 2004). Porter and Gowthrope (2004) argued that the gap 
consisted of two major components: 1) the reasonableness gap; and 2) the performance gap. 
The reasonableness gap is defined as a result of the difference in what society expects the 
auditors to achieve and what auditors can be reasonably expected to achieve. The 
performance gap is the difference between what society expects auditors to accomplish and 
what they are perceived to have accomplished (Porter & Gowthrope, 2004) (see Figure 2). 
The next two sections will explain the reasonableness gap and the performance gap in detail. 
 
Figure 2: Components of the audit expectation gap (adapted from Porter, 1993, p. 50) 
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2.5.1.1 Reasonableness gap 
 It can be seen in Figure 2 that a major cause of the reasonableness gap is the 
unreasonable expectations from users. Salehi (2011) gives the probable causes of the 
reasonableness gap as: misunderstandings and misinterpretation by users, users’ over-
expectations of auditors’ performance, and inadequate knowledge by users of auditors’ 
responsibilities, for example, fraud. During the nineteenth century, fraud detection was seen 
as an audit objective (Higson, 2003). The judgement in Nichol’s Case (1859) stated that it 
was part of an auditor’s duty to discover fraudulent misrepresentations. Consequently, the 
detection of fraud was one of the auditor’s top priorities (Lee, 1986). As a result, auditors 
were engaged to provide almost “absolute” assurance against fraud (Epstein & Geiger, 1994). 
The judgement in Kingston Cotton Mill Case (1896) saw the decline in the importance of 
fraud as an audit objective and the auditor did not have to assume going into the audit that 
something was wrong, however, if something was discovered, the auditor should investigate 
it to ensure the error was not material. This case gave rise to the famous saying ‘an auditor is 
a watchdog but not a bloodhound’. The judgement in Irish Woollen Co. Ltd v Tyson and 
Others (1990), held that an auditor is liable for any damages sustained by a company by 
reason of falsification which might have been discovered by the exercise of reasonable care 
and skill in performing an audit. Therefore, instead of having to detect all frauds, it was 
becoming apparent that it was the auditors’ duty to exercise reasonable care and skill in the 
conduct of their work. Despite this gradual change, the public’s expectation with regard to 
auditors’ detection of fraud remains unchanged (Hassink, Bollen, Meuwissen, & de Vries, 
2009). Thereby, misunderstandings in an auditor’s role attributes to the reasonableness gap. 
Porter (1993) found that 60 percent of society was aware of what an auditor’s responsibilities 
are. This result is confirmed in a later study which found 50 percent of society being unsure 
to what an auditors’ responsibilities are (Porter & Gowthrope, 2001).  
 With regard to ISA 720, Bedard et al., (2012) finds investor groups, professional and 
nonprofessional, demand greater assurance concerning the “other information”. The groups 
perceived that certain narratives were audited when they were not. This suggests the 
existence of the “reasonableness gap” between what society expects auditors to achieve and 
what they can reasonably be expected to accomplish and is dependent on a cost-benefit 
analysis (Porter, 1993). This expectation may be explained due to the ambiguity within the 
ISA 720 and society is not completely aware of the nature of the attest function of the auditor 
(McEnroe & Martens, 2001).  
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2.5.1.2 Performance gap 
 The performance gap is defined as the difference between what is reasonably 
expected by society, and what is perceived to be achieved (Porter, 1993). Due to the limited 
scope of this study, there is a focus here on the performance gap (see section 2.3.1.2) as we 
do not directly consider the views of regulators or users. Thus, not all aspects of the 
expectation gap can be assessed. This gap is emphasised by Porter (1993) who further 
narrows it into two components: 1) deficient standard gap; and 2) deficient performance gap 
(see Figure 3). 
 
Figure 3: Components of the performance gap (adapted from Porter, 1993) 
2.5.1.2.1 Deficient standards 
 The deficient standard gap is the difference between what auditors are reasonably 
expected to do by society and what the laws, standards and regulations prescribe them to do 
(Porter, 1993). It is the gap between the responsibilities expected and the responsibilities 
defined by statute. Although some of these responsibilities expected are unreasonable, a few 
are reasonable and therefore highlight the defect in the standard (Porter & Gowthorpe, 2004). 
 Porter, Ó Hogartaigh, & Baskerville (2012) provide evidence in the perceived 
deficient standards within ISA 720 and find auditors examining the reliability of the “other 
information” in the company’s entire annual report reasonable. Furthermore, they stated that 
further guidance is necessary to the extent in which they should review the “other 
information”. 
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2.5.1.2.2 Deficient performance 
 The failure of auditors to perform up to the reasonable responsibilities expected by 
society is referred to as the deficient performance gap (Porter, 1993). Akinbuli (2010) called 
this the “rotten auditing gap” to describe the perceived underperformance of the auditors by 
the users, a performance inconsistent with professional standards.  
 From the analysis of ISA 720, coupled with empirical evidence (Fisher & Naylor, 
2016; Clatworthy & Jones, 2006), a great deal of judgement and subjectivity is involved in 
determining what constitutes a material inconsistency. This gives rise to inconsistent 
practices as the standard will be interpreted by in various ways and the level of precision to 
be applied in the review of the “other information” will differ amongst practitioners. This 
may result in deficient performance as auditors are not performing what the ISA 720 is 
required.  
 As discussed in Fisher and Naylor (2016) and Porter et al., (2012), many recurring 
issues initially appear in the expectation gap as part of the “reasonableness gap” and 
gradually, the cost-benefit equation becomes apparent. This causes an issue to shift into the 
deficient standards component and may be seen as the auditing profession attempting to 
enhance their legitimacy with the intention of fostering the belief that their actions are 
congruent with the expectations, values, and norms of constituents (Richardson & Dowling, 
1986). This is because auditors’ legitimacy with clients is crucial (Power, 2003) and the 
profession is then more likely to agree with society’s expectations and demand. The initial 
issue appearing in the expectation gap will perhaps end up becoming the actual 
responsibilities of auditors through pronouncements. ISA 720 is evident of this movement.  
 From the above analysis, there is substantial evidence that implicates that standard-
setters have contributed to the expectation-performance gap and not only users. 
2.6 Summary 
 To summarise, the objective of this chapter was to demonstrate the linkages between 
current literature on the “other information” and the auditor’s roles and responsibilities for 
them and the knowledge gap that informed the development of key research questions.  
 The chairman’s statement, while it can provide important strategic information to 
readers, is also considered a medium for impression management (Merkl-Davis & Brennan, 
2007). Consequently, there is the possibility for conflicting messages between the chairman’s 
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statement and financial statements to be conveyed. This is of concern, as it is not known how 
auditors assess the chairman’s statement during the audit of the financial statements and calls 
for the chairman’s statement to be audited (Clatworthy & Jones, 2006).  
 Visuals, such as graphs, have the ability to influence a user’s decision-making process 
(Arunachalam, 2002) and are supposedly reflective of the financial statements. However, as 
Jones (2011) and Beattie and Jones (1997) have noted, there are a number of ways they could 
be manipulated and display inconsistent results with the financial statements. There are 
currently no guidelines in the preparation of graphs and authors have recognised the need for 
auditing guidelines to address the accuracy and presentation of these (Beattie & Jones, 1997).  
 Resulting from the emergence of IFR, there are a number of benefits such as the 
improved cost efficiencies and user access; and difficulties such as the integrity and 
auditability of the data. Currently, there is confusion amongst users as to what information is 
audited on the entity’s website and what is not. Due to the reliance upheld by users on web 
documents, evidence suggests there is an unmet demand for the audit of web documents 
(Fisher & Naylor, 2016; Bedard et al., 2012) and it is currently not known how, or if, auditors 
review web documents.  
 Regarding IR, where its purpose is to integrate nonfinancial and financial information 
into a concise document, the question is: what is audited and what isn’t? This new form of 
reporting will only exacerbate many of the problems currently being faced. It will blur the 
distinction of the “other information” and the financial statements.  
 The revision of ISA 720 was to better reflect the changing reporting environment 
(IAASBb, 2015). Currently, auditors are required to read the “other information” in order to 
identify material inconsistencies, if any, with the audited financial statements. In its revision, 
it broadens and expands the scope of work auditors are required to do regarding the “other 
information”. A notable change was in the objective where auditors have to be wary of 
whether a material inconsistency exists between the “other information” and the auditor’s 
knowledge obtained in the audit. A search of current literature into how auditors review 
“other information” revealed that such literature is non-existent thus, presenting a significant 
knowledge gap.   
 The audit expectation–performance gap is utilised as a framework to allow the 
identification of specific responsibilities contributing to the “performance gap” in particular, 
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the deficient performance and deficient standards components. From the review of the 
literature, Bedard et al., (2012) shows there is a reasonableness gap with respect to the “other 
information” where investors perceived that the “other information” was audited when, in 
fact, it was not. Porter et al., (2012) links ISA 720 to the deficient standards component of the 
performance gap and suggests that it is reasonable for auditors to provide the reliability of the 
entire audit report. A review of (current and revised) ISA 720 shows there is a deficient 
performance due to the level of judgement required by auditors and the subjectivity with the 
standard which is open to different interpretations. Consequently, this results in inconsistent 
practices. In addition, the audit expectation–performance gap allows us to analyse the 
implications of ISA 720 on the gap and to see if it has narrowed or widened as a result of the 
revision. This literature review has revealed a number of knowledge gaps that formed the 
basis for the current study and is discussed next.  
2.7 Research questions 
 As stated in Chapter 1, the objective of this study is to investigate how auditors audit 
“other information”. Little is known about current practices related to the review of “other 
information” when auditors audit financial statements. The current literature indicates that 
“other information” is useful in supporting users in their decision-making and ISA 720 also 
deems “other information” to be of public interest. Hence, the fundamental aim of this 
research is to develop a better understanding of the day-to-day realities for auditors with 
respect to “other information”. This then provides an insight on this important research topic 
This research collected views of audit practitioners in New Zealand on the following research 
questions: 
RQ1  What do auditors perceive to be their role and responsibility for “other information” 
while auditing financial statements? 
 RQ1 allows us to consider the degree to which auditors view of their roles and 
responsibilities coincide with those of standard-setters and other parties. 
RQ2  How does ISA 720, both current and revised versions, affect practice and what 
challenges do auditors face in implementing its requirements? 
 In contrast to RQ1, RQ2 considers how auditors implement the requirements of ISA 
720 in a real world setting and provides auditors with an opportunity to reflect on issues faced 
in implementing ISA 720. 
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RQ3  What are the implications of the findings for RQ1 and RQ2 for the audit expectation 
gap? 
 RQ3 places the evidence obtained in connection with RQ1 and RQ2 in the context of 
the audit expectation–performance gap, thereby providing a basis for assessing auditors’ 
performance and determining what actions, if any, are needed to address any expectations 
gap that might have arisen with respect to ISA 720. 
 The next chapter explains the research methodology and method in gathering, 




Chapter 3 – Research methodology and method 
 This chapter explains the research methodology and method used for this study. The 
design of the research is determined by the nature of this study which falls within a 
qualitative paradigm. Evidence is collected through semi-structured interviews with audit 
partners from various auditing firms in New Zealand.  
 This chapter is organised in the following way. First, it details the research 
methodology; second, it analyses the research method; third, it documents the detailed 
research process; fourth, it introduces the managing of interview data and the process of data 
analysis; and fifth, it outlines the limitations of this study and concludes with a summary. 
3.1 Theoretical framework 
 To answer the research questions, an in-depth understanding of audit practitioners’ 
experiences and thoughts are crucial. This will require direct contact between the researcher 
and the practitioner as such “proximity enables the researcher to obtain personal 
understanding of the realities and minutiae” (Patton, 2002, p.151). Thus, a qualitative and 
interpretive research approach is appropriate for the current study.  
 Qualitative research enables researchers to gain an in-depth understanding of the 
“why and how” for certain phenomenon (Taylor & Bogdan, 1998). This study aims to 
understand how auditors engage with “other information” and apply ISA 720. Thus, the 
essence of this study is an interpretive exploration into the engagement of auditors regarding 
their application of ISA 720. It is an exploration of how subjectivities shape auditors’ duties. 
No participant will have the same interpretations and expectations of the terms, nor do I as 
the researcher. Due to its subjectivity, this research will be undertaken using the ontological 
perspective of a constructionist and the epistemological stance of an interpretivist.  
 A constructivist considers social entities as social constructions built up from the 
perceptions and actions of social actors (Bryman & Bell, 2011). Given the fact that audit is 
itself a “social phenomenon” (Flint, 1988), this stance is most fitting. Interpretivism provides 
an understanding of social reality based on the subjective interpretation of the researcher 
(McKercher, 2010). This means that I acknowledge that my findings are subjective and open 
to interpretations and, that my experiences and knowledge will influence the conclusions 
reached in this study.  
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3.2 Research method 
 Patton (1990) suggests that qualitative methods “are ways of finding out what people 
do, know, think, and feel by observing, interviewing, and analysing documents” (p.94). This 
section is organised into two-parts. First, it gives the rationale for using interviews for the 
current study; and second, it identifies the weaknesses inherent in interviews and discusses 
how these weaknesses are addressed.  
3.2.1 Interviews 
 Interviews are employed for this study as they provide the best possible understanding 
of-the-problems-(Taylor & Bogdan, 1998) and allow researchers “to put behaviour in context 
and provide access to understanding their action” (Seidman, 2006, p.10). Interviews are 
flexible and also enable an in-depth understanding of the research topic (Cassell & Symon, 
1994). 
 Interviews allow participants to express themselves freely according to their own 
thinking, in contrast to questionnaires which may constrain people’s thinking with only a 
selection of alternatives to choose-from (Ghauri & Gronhaug, 2005). Face-to-face interviews 
are chosen because the physical presence of an interviewer often enhances the interviewer-
respondent rapport. The interviewer is able to further enquire, respond to questions and 
clarify the meaning of questions to minimise misunderstanding (Shuy, 2003). It also allows 
the interviewer to access the non-verbal information expressed by interviewees through 
gestures, and facial expressions (Knox & Burkard, 2009). Moreover, it is easier to establish 
trust and openness during an in-person interview allows deep descriptions of interviewees’ 
experiences (Polkinghorne, 1994). Furthermore, interviews more effectively encourage 
interviewees’ responses to “why” and “how” questions in order to address the research 
questions of this study. The interviewer may also pick up emerging themes from the answers 
provided by the interviewees, which could lead to further questions and.  
 Semi-structured interviews will be used, rather than structured or unstructured 
interviews. This is because the former may engender leading questions, shaping the interview 
too much and not allow themes to emerge. Also, it may not provide an in-depth insight into 
an auditor’s application of ISA 720. The latter, given the context, may lead to conversations 
going off-topic, with the data becoming too fragmented to generate any useful findings.  
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 Semi-structured interviews allow certain themes to be discussed while being flexible 
(Bryman & Bell, 2011) so that “the interviewees have a degree of freedom to explain their 
thoughts and to highlight areas of particular interest and expertise they felt they had” (Horton, 
Macve, & Struyven, 2004, p. 340). Semi-structured interviews use an indicative guide which 
makes sure that key questions are consistent. Furthermore, a guide facilitates data analysis 
and ensures comparability of responses (Patton, 2002) (see Appendix 2 for the interview 
guide).  
 However, there are weaknesses with interviews which need to be addressed. 
Interviews can be very time consuming and are expensive to conduct (Seidman, 2006) as they 
may involve travelling, taking the initiative to make contact and transcribing the recordings. 
However, the costs are compensated by the richness of data collected. As Seidman (2006) 
states, “any method of inquiry worth anything takes time, thoughtfulness, energy and money” 
(p.12).  
 Another concern associated with interviews is the reliability of interviewees’ 
responses, or a reluctance to respond to questions due to personal circumstances. To 
minimise this risk, the key is to build an open and honest relationship with interviewees 
(Taylor & Bogdan, 1998). Knox & Burkard (2009) also share this view and comment that: 
the strength of the interviewer-participant relationship is perhaps the single most 
important  aspect of a qualitative research project: it is through this relationship 
that all data are collected and data validity is strengthened  
 The strategies the researcher used to establish a good relationship and obtain valuable 
answers from interviewees included creating a good impression through appropriate attire 
and professional greetings; asking questions in a less formal way but in a polite manner; 
making the tone consultative; and assuring interviewees of confidentiality. The strategies 
applied to overcome the weaknesses associated with interviews were addressed during the 
research process.  
3.3 Research process 
 This section details the research process of how the interviews were planned and 
conducted. Interviews are a complicated and involved process, requiring planning and 
preparation (Qu & Dumay, 2011). They also require particular skills such as intensive 
listening and note taking. At the pre-planning stage, a number of questions needed to be 




approach the participants and how the interview data would be analysed (Qu & Dumay, 
2011). This section consists of four sub-sections. First, it gives the reasons for the number of 
participants; second; it explains why these participants were chosen; third, it explains how 
participants were recruited; and last, the detailed process for conducting the interviews is 
explained.  
3.3.1 Sampling 
 Due to the nature of the research, purposive sampling was utilised, focusing in-depth 
on a small, deliberately selected sample. Lincoln and Guba (1985) explain purposive 
sampling as “sampling done with some purpose in mind” (p. 202). This enables researchers to 
gain insight and deepen their understanding of the phenomena they study (Patton, 1990). This 
technique led to a range of participants who formed a rich source of varied research evidence. 
The next section provides a profile of the interviewees.  
3.3.2 Profile of interviewees 
 The interviewees in this study comprised of financial auditors practicing at partner 
level in New Zealand. The interviewees were selected based on their primary role. Audit 
partners formed the most suitable group of interviewees to ask regarding their experiences 
and views in applying ISA 720. This is because of their direct involvement in the audit 
process, where the review of the “other information” comes near completion of the audit and 
is done by the partner of the engagement before the audit report is signed-off.  
 Nine audit partners were chosen for this research given the time-frame of this thesis. 
Of the nine audit partner interviewees; six were from “Big 4” firms; one from a mid-tier firm; 
and two were public sector auditors from the Office of the Auditor General. No partners were 
sought from smaller or local boutique firms as they are not likely to deal with the type of 
information this study is concerned with. For example, upon contacting a smaller firm, the 
response given was: 
We deal with mainly unlisted/non-issuer private companies/subsidiaries, or tier 3 
and 4 not-for-profits. Generally, the type of narrative information you are looking 
at is non-existent on the financial statements we audit  
[I0]. 
He went on further and said:  
I’m not a licensed auditor, merely a qualified one. I would contact the licensed 















Table 1: Demographics of interviewees 
After determining the appropriate participants for this study, the next step is how to recruit 
them.  
3.3.3 Recruiting interviewees 
 Audit partners were mainly recruited through e-mail. Once participants indicated that 
they were available to be interviewed, the researcher contacted the interviewees directly by e-
mail or telephone to arrange meetings for interviews.  
 All participants contacted had a vague idea of the research topic, as the researcher 
sent an email, outlining the research topic, the nature of the research, and the rights of the 
participants.  
3.3.4 Conducting the interviews 
 All interviews were conducted at the interviewees’ offices. The researcher followed a 
standard protocol at each interview meeting. For example, the researcher greeted the 
interviewees, introduced herself and then thanked them for their participation. In doing so, 
the researcher was working to establish rapport from the beginning of the interview. To this 
end, the researcher gave a brief introduction outlining the research topic, the nature of the 
research, and the rights of the participants. The researcher also requested permission to record 
Interviewee Big-4 Mid-tier Public sector Position 
1 ✓   Partner 
2   ✓ Audit Director 
3   ✓ Audit Director 
4 ✓   Partner 
5 ✓   Partner 
6  ✓  Partner 
7 ✓   Partner 
8 ✓   Partner 
9 ✓   Partner 
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the interview. All interviews were recorded. These protocols were established to ensure 
interviewees felt comfortable, and therefore more likely to provide genuine answers.  
 The researcher adopted a relatively loosely-structured interview approach. According 
to Alvesson (2003), qualitative interviews are “relatively loosely structured and open to what 
the interviewee feels is relevant and important to talk about, given the interest of the research 
project” (p. 13). All interviews started with a broad open-ended question as the interviewees 
would be more likely to share more about their experiences and views on subsequent open-
ended questions.  
 Semi-structured interviews were a successful approach for this study as they allowed 
interviewees to share in-depth information. Interviewing also provided the flexibility for the 
researcher to ask questions in a different order and inquire a little deeper into the answer 
given during an interview. In some cases, where the researcher did not understand the 
responses, she would ask the particular interviewee to explain (“What do you mean by… ?”) 
or rephrase what the particular interviewee had just said (“Do you mean that…?”). This was 
done to clarify the meaning with the interviewees.  
 Each interview lasted between 20 and 60 minutes. The researcher purposely did not 
schedule a time-frame, to allow the participant to feel more comfortable and at ease.  
 Although the interviews were recorded, the researcher still took notes of key points, 
examples given, interesting quotations and emerging themes that the interviewer shared 
(Ghauri & Gronhaug, 2005; Taylor & Bogdan, 1998). Patton (1990) points out that “the use 
of the tape recorder does not eliminate the need for taking notes” (p. 348). At the end of each 
interview, the researcher thanked the interviewee again for his or her time and for their 
valuable contribution to the research.  
3.4 Interview Data 
 Interview data provide a considerable amount of information (Seidman, 2006) which 
needs to be organised and managed in an orderly manner. This section explains how the 
interview data was recorded and transcribed and how to determine if the interview data is 
trustworthy.  
3.4.1 Recording and transcribing 
 There is debate on whether interviews should be recorded. Seidman (2006) considers 
that in-depth interviews should “no doubt” be recorded (p.114) while Lincoln and Guba 
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(1985) think that recorders can be seen as intrusive or may fail technically so they “do not 
recommend recording except for unusual reasons” (p. 241). However, modern recording 
devices are no longer seen as intrusive.  
 There are a number of benefits from recording the interviews. Recording enables the 
researcher to transcribe the interviews readily and reliably. For example, if there is anything 
unclear in the transcript, the researcher can always refer to the original source to check 
accuracy (Seidman, 2006). As the interviewer is an integral part of the conversation, 
recording allows her to focus on the interview better, rather than being busy taking notes 
(Hayes & Mattimoe, 2004). The concern with recording is that it may discourage 
interviewees from openly sharing some information (Seidman, 2006). The researcher used a 
small digital recorder which was not seen as intrusive. After the researcher explained that the 
recording was only for data analysis and would be kept securely and confidentially, the 
interviewees gave their permission for recording to take place. All audio files were stored on 
the researcher’s computer which was password locked in her office. The interviewees were 
given the opportunity to verify the transcripts prior to analysis. The transcripts (editable Word 
documents) were sent back to the interviewees, who were then asked to review them, provide 
feedback and make changes. Further analysis was not taken until the approved transcripts had 
been returned.  
3.4.2 Data evaluation 
 The interview data collected from individuals are subjective in nature. The 
interpretation of the data by the researcher is also subjective. However, research findings 
must be trustworthy. Lincoln and Guba (1985) stated that, “… conventional trustworthiness 
criteria (internal and external validity, reliability and objectivity) are inconsistent...” (p.42) 
with qualitative research methods. Therefore, they suggested “credibility, transferability, 
dependability and confirmability” as substitute criteria coupled with “corresponding 
empirical procedures” to “absolutely affirm the trustworthiness…” (Lincoln & Guba, 1985, p. 
43). These substitute criteria for trustworthiness, credibility, transferability, dependability and 
confirmability are discussed below.  
3.4.2.1 Trustworthiness of interview data 
3.4.2.1.1 Credibility  
 “Credibility” substitutes the concept of “internal validity” in quantitative research. It 
answers the questions “How can I know that what the interviewees said is true?” (Seidman, 
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2006, p. 23). In a constructivist’s inquiry, there is no single objective reality. Instead, reality 
is multiple and is interpreted by individuals in their own context (see section 3.1). Therefore, 
credibility “focuses on establishing a match between the constructed realities of respondents 
and those realities represented by the researcher” (Sinkovics et al., 2008, p.699). This in 
essence, means that the researcher can find evidence to verify interviewees’ comments. The 
effort of finding evidence to prove credibility rests with the researcher (Thomas & Magilvy, 
2011).  
 Credibility can be established through triangulation (Cutcliffe & McKenna, 1999; 
Taylor & Bogdan, 1998; Tracy, 2010). Triangulation increases credibility through involving 
multiple sources of data, methods, and theoretical frameworks (Lincoln & Guba, 1985; 
Tracy, 2010). The use of multiple data sources is a strategy that also enhances data credibility 
(Patton, 1990). Triangulation was achieved through data gathered from difference sources 
(for example, auditors in public practice, private practice, and existing literature). The 
researcher also found similarities in the interviewees’ answers across all participants in this 
study, which enhances confidence in the interview data. The findings in this study also 
triangulate to the literature and to some news in the media.  
3.4.2.1.2 Transferability 
 “Transferability” parallels the concept “external validity” where it shifts the 
responsibility for the transfer of the research findings from the researcher to the reader. In 
order to do this: 
Thick description [is] necessary to enable someone interested in making a 
transfer to reach a  conclusion about whether transfer can be contemplated as a 
possibility… [Therefore, the researcher] is responsible for providing the widest 
possible range of information for  inclusion in the thick description… that makes 
transferability judgement possible on the part of potential appliers.  
[Lincoln and Guba, 1985, p. 316]. 
 Thus, to establish transferability of this research, information was provided in a 
detailed manner with many quotations in the interviewees’ own words (see Chapter 4) and 
details of the research process.  
3.4.2.1.3 Dependability and confirmability 
 “Dependability and confirmability” are the naturalistic equivalent of the conventional 
concept of “reliability and objectivity” respectively. Lincoln and Guba (1985) suggested that 
an “audit trail” be maintained throughout the course of the research to provide a level of 
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assurance for dependability and confirmability. An audit trail “consists of documentation of 
the nature of each decision in the research plan, the data upon which it was based, and the 
reasoning that entered into it” (Owens, 1982, p.13). This enables the verification of the 
consistency and credibility of research procedures and makes it possible to reproduce this 
study at another point in time. The audit trail in this study is this method section.  
3.5 Data Analysis  
 Qualitative data analysis is an intuitive and inductive reasoning process (Seidman, 
2006; Taylor & Bogdan, 1998). It involves 
working with research evidence, organising it, breaking it into manageable units, 
synthesising it, searching for patterns, discovering what is important, what is to 
be learned  and deciding what you will tell others.  
[Bogdan & Biklem, 1982, p.145]. 
 An interview generates large amounts of data (Seidman, 2006). It is an intellectual job 
to make sense of interview data and organise it in a presentable and meaningful order (Ghauri 
& Gronhaug, 2005). The data analysis is based on three stages: 1) identifying themes and 
developing concepts and propositions; 2) coding and refining one’s understanding of the 
subject matter; and 3) interpreting data in the context in which they were collected (Taylor & 
Bogdan, 1984).  
3.5.1 Identifying themes  
 Qualitative data analysis starts with the data collection process (Taylor & Bogdan, 
1998). This stage involves familiarisation with the interview data. The researcher reads the 
transcripts multiple times, looking for recurring ideas, language, patterns of beliefs and 
actions in the transcripts (Rossman & Rallis, 2012). This ongoing process helped the 
researcher to constantly theorise and make sense of the data collected. This recurring 
information provided concepts and propositions. For instance, many interviewees talked 
about the Financial Markets Authority (FMA). The researcher had not paid much attention to 
the FMA before collecting the data. Therefore, the researcher studied about the FMA in 
relation to this study and ended up finding a new avenue for future research.  
3.5.2 Coding the data 
 The interview data were coded using NVivo 11, a software package for analysing 
qualitative data. Using computer assisted qualitative data analysis software (CAQDAS), such 
as NVivo, formalises the data analysis of qualitative research (Sinkovics, 2008). It can 
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enhance the trustworthiness and quality of data because it provides transparency for how the 
data are coded (Huberman & Miles, 1994).  
 The coding process was smooth. Here, the researcher read the interview transcripts 
numerous times to gain an understanding of the responses and listened to the recordings to 
check the accuracy of the transcripts. The interview transcripts were imported into NVivo as 
sources. Following this, the researcher then coded the transcripts with a “node” whenever a 
meaning of a sentence emerged. As coding progressed, it became apparent that many 
concepts were related and these were classified into a series of categories and related sub-
categories. This facilitated greater understanding of the body of evidence through examining 
key themes. However, NVivo cannot be a substitute for the researcher to intelligently analyse 
or interpret the data (Dolan & Ayland, 2001). It is merely a mechanism to sort data (Rossman 
& Rallis, 2012). The researcher was in full control of the process of the categorisation and 
interpretation of the data.  
3.5.3 Interpreting and presenting data 
 Interpreting the data involves understanding the literal, unedited statements of 
interviewees in the context in which they are collected (Taylor & Bogdan, 1998). It is a 
process of making sense of what the interviewees said and then communicating the meaning 
to the readers (Rossman & Rallis, 2012). Inductive data analysis was applied to this research. 
This is a process for “making sense of field data” (Lincoln & Guba, 1985, p.202). The 
research was driven by evidence gathered by qualitative interviews. This meant that the 
researcher worked “from the interview evidence specific to participants to a more general 
conclusion” (Schwandt, 2001, p.125).  
 After the researcher coded the data into main themes, then into nodes and sub-nodes, 
she looked into each sub-node to interpret and summarise the information provided by the 
interviewees. For example, within the theme of “scope”, many interviewees commented that 
the timing of the “other information” given to them was challenging. The researcher then 
paid attention to the different reasons for it being a challenge. The researcher chose the 
common reasons that were mentioned by a number of different interviewees. The quotations 
that best represented common views are reported in the findings chapter.  
 In order to maintain interviewees’ confidentiality, each was assigned a unique 
reference number. Quotations in findings are presented with the reference number of a 
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particular interviewee. For example, I1 represented interviewee one. The interviewees are not 
numbered in any particular order.  
3.6 Limitations 
 A limitation to this research could have been gaining access to the appropriate 
personnel for the interviews, particularly auditors at a partner level. They are presumably 
busy people and a student’s research may be overlooked and not be at the top of their 
priorities. Also the interview may be seen as a threat to their organisation’s legitimacy. There 
may also be concerns over information about actual processes being disclosed by the 
researcher (Gendron, 2000). To lessen this concern, the research topic was provided to the 
participants to allow the individuals to be acquainted with the research. The documents stated 
the objective(s) of the research (i.e. how auditors apply the ISA 720) and specific aspects of 
the interview, including confidentiality and anonymity for participants and their firms. The 
participants were provided with a copy of the transcript to ensure they were comfortable with 
what was recorded and they were able to correct information before the analysis. In addition, 
they have the right to withdraw from the study at any time.   
 This study involves a relatively small sample of professional auditors from New 
Zealand, therefore, the generalisability of research findings are restricted. However, Gray, 
Collison, French, McPhail and Stevenson (2001) noted that the ideas and experiences of 
international-auditors-are-global-in-nature. Since a large number of New Zealand auditors are 
affiliated with global firms (such as the “Big-4” firm), they-will-fundamentally-face-similar-
audit-issues-as international auditors. Furthermore, the auditing standards New Zealand 
auditors are expected to comply with are consistent in all material respects with International 
Auditing Standards (NZICA, 2010). In addition, the audit methodologies and practice 
standards the “Big-4” and other audit firms apply are universally adopted by their global firm 
partners. Thus, this study-would-be-relevant-to-the-audit-profession-globally. 
3.7 Chapter summary 
 In summary this chapter introduced and explained the choice of research methodology 
and method. Interviews were chosen as the research method as they can be flexible and are 
able to generate rich information. The trustworthiness of the data is ensured by providing 
details of the process of the research. How interview data are evaluated and managed are also 
explained along with the limitations. The next chapter presents the interview findings.  
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Chapter 4 – Research findings 
 As stated in chapter 1, the objective of this study is to investigate auditors’ 
consideration of “other information” in the context of ISA 720. More specifically, the study 
seeks answers to the following research questions (see chapter 2): 
1. What do auditors perceive to be their role and responsibility for “other 
information” while auditing financial statements? 
2. How does ISA 720 (both the current and revised versions) affect practice and 
what challenges do auditors face in implementing its requirements? 
3. What are the implications of the findings for the audit expectation gap? 
 The next section discusses the interview findings for the first research question. 
References to ISA 720 will refer to the extant standard unless stated otherwise. Quotations in 
italics are actual interview responses.  
4.1 Auditors’ perception of “other information” 
 Chapter 2 outlined the overwhelming support and need for strengthening auditor’s 
responsibilities with respect to “other information”. To answer research question 1, 
interviewees were asked about two areas: (4.1.1) their general awareness of “other 
information”; and (5.1.2) perceptions of their current role in the context of ISA 720. 
4.1.1 Awareness of “other information”  
 The audit partners interviewed are familiar with “other information” in the context of 
ISA 720. An interviewee described the process in applying the standard: 
…what I’ll do is I’ll read it. I’m looking through it for anything that I think is 
inconsistent with what I know about the financial statements [and] about the 
company…  
[I5]. 
 A government auditor described their process and experience in applying their 
equivalent standard (AG-4 revised): 
We look at the whole performance which will include words, descriptions, claims, 
flow charts, and strategies. Having read the whole report of performance 
information we would then see how it gels together. It would only be materially 
wrong if you felt that something was misleading, it wasn’t consistent with the 
message of the targets and reported performance until we’ve seen the whole 




 Documents containing audited financial statements vary in detail and length. ISA 720 
determines what should be reviewed and what is outside the scope of the audit. The following 
quote highlights an auditor’s main area of focus: 
Our focus is on anything that is directly related to commentary on the financial 
statements. If it’s a director’s report or some other report that is focusing directly 
on the financial statement, that’s our key focus area that we would do detailed 
work on 
[I6].  
 The same interviewee described the process applied when commentary is provided 
outside the annual report: 
If it’s part of the annual report [and] there are other supplementary reports 
going, we would also read those just to make sure there’s nothing in those that 
would highlight something that would have an impact on the financial statements  
[I6]. 
 Another interviewee remarked that ISA 720 is not as stringent to comply with relative 
to other standards. This suggests a lower level of assurance being provided in relation to the 
“other information” than in other areas of the audit: 
We make sure if there’s reconciliations back to GAAP that they actually make 
sense and we know where the numbers have come from but it is a lesser degree of 
rigour than is applied to the actual financial statements themselves  
[I7]. 
 The next section presents interview findings on the perceived current role of auditors 
regarding “other information”. 
4.1.2 Current role of auditors regarding “other information”  
[A]n audit opinion at the moment doesn’t cover “other information” but there is 
an obligation under [ISA 720] for us to read other information and make sure 
it’s consistent with  audited financials 
[I9]. 
 The findings of this study indicated that the audit partners interviewed are, in general, 
aware of their duties with regard to “other information”. This is not a recent phenomenon, as 
the auditor’s understanding of the entity and its environment acquired during the audit is 
fundamental to the risk assessment process and is carried out in compliance with ISA 315 
Identifying and Assessing the Risks of Material Misstatement Through Understanding the 
Entity and its Environment. Auditors have a responsibility for any documents that contains 
audited financial statements: 
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That’s effectively what your duty is because something is going out that’s 
accompanying your audit report and therefore there’s a connection and because 
you’ve got this connection, it’s making sure they hang together  
[I4]. 
 Another interviewee agreed: 
Whilst we’re not opining over that commentary it would be a bad look if that 
information is inconsistent with the financial statements  
[I8]. 
 A few of the interviewees highlighted related concerns. One such concern is that there 
is a perception that the level of responsibility over “other information” is increasing and has 
perhaps extended well beyond what they are primarily responsible for: 
[Our] primary role is to make sure the financial statements are fairly presented. 
We look for consistency, mainly, with those other statements and those other 
reports but the obligations are increasing  
[I9]. 
 However, the following interviewee stated that they already perform what is required 
of them which suggests that standards are “lagging” (Humphrey, 1992): 
Our internal view on these things is that we effectively have a level of 
responsibility over everything that appears in the annual report that includes our 
opinion no matter whether it’s in the financial statements or in broader 
information. We’ve probably already been looking beyond what our strict 
requirements are  
[I1]. 
 Nevertheless, the benefit from the auditor reading and considering “other 
information” is a signal given to management and those charged with governance that such 
information is important to users of the financial statements. An interviewee explained how 
management has taken on this signal:  
I think [it is being taken seriously] because of the liability issues and the 
directors’ awareness around them. [They could be] getting themselves into 
difficulty if they are seen to be misleading….I have seen an improved focus from 
the experienced directors around making sure that the  company isn’t making 
misleading statements… I think there has been an improvement in the quality of 
qualitative information because people understand that there are concerns of 
risks if they were to mislead  
[I6]. 
 Another interviewee commented on the positive implications of the standard: 
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[Management commentary is] getting better because it’s now under more scrutiny 
than it was [before]. [Management] had to lift their game. They used to be able to 
get away with pretty much anything they wanted… it wasn’t validated...they made 
all these big wild claims and it didn’t stack up and that [has] really put the onus 
on auditors to put more focus [on reading “other information”]. ISA 720 
certainly puts a bit more emphasis on us to make sure we read it all  
[I1]. 
 With regard to public sector audits, the ISA 720 equivalent is AG-4:  
 [The Auditor-General] takes the International Auditing Standards and … she 
adds onto  what’s  required to meet her brief under the Public Audit Act… What 
we’re doing is a step up  from how private sector audits are auditing Spark or 
Fletcher Building and other companies  listed on the Stock Exchange. So we’re 
doing more work at a higher quality  
[I3]. 
 This is an indication, that both in private and public sector audits, auditors are aware 
of the importance “other information” has on the understanding of the financial statements.  
 In summary, auditors’ are well aware of the importance of the “other information” 
relative to the audited financial statements. They identified their primary role as ensuring the 
credibility of the audited financial statements and that the statements are not undermined by 
the “other information”. Therefore, they review it to ensure consistency between the two 
parts. In addition, as the audit report is issued with the annual report, it is important that the 
audit report reflects the auditor’s opinion on the whole report. Otherwise, auditors are opened 
to legal liability. Thus, auditors feel the need to review the entirety of the annual report. As a 
result, they perceive their roles to be somewhat broader than what required in ISA 720. 
 The next section addresses research question 2, which considers how ISA 720 affects 
practice and the challenges auditors face in implementing its requirements. 
4.2 Effect on current practice and challenges 
 This section covers the impact ISA 720 has on current audit practice and the 
challenges auditors face supported by interview findings and literature. The exposure draft of 
the revised standard made modifications according to these headings:  objective; scope; 
definitions; work effort; documenting; responding; and reporting. Thus, these headings are 
used in this section.  
4.2.1 Objective 






 Under the current ISA 720, the objective of the auditor is to read and consider the 
“other information” in order to identify material inconsistencies which contradicts 
information in the audited financial statements or that may indicate that the audited financial 
statements have been materially misstated (see ISA 720, paragraph 4). Under the revision of 
ISA 720, there a shift in objective which puts more focus on inconsistencies with the 
auditor’s understanding of the entity and its environment rather than just inconsistencies with 
the audited financial statements (see ISA 720 (revised), paragraph 11 (B)). Due to the 
subjectivity in the knowledge an auditor acquires about the entity and the shift in objective, 
this blurs the distinction between managements’ and auditors’ responsibilities with regard to 
what should or should not be included in the annual report.  
4.2.2 Scope 
 Another change made to ISA 720, was the expansion of the scope. ISA 720 (revised) 
expands the scope from “other information” in documents “containing” the audited financial 
statements (see extant ISA 720, paragraph 2) to also include “other information” that 
“accompanies” the audited financial statements (see ISA 720 (revised), paragraph 12(a)). 
This is because the IAASB recognised that “other information” may be located separately 
from the audited financial statements (IAASB, 2011). The expansion of the “scope” may 
have implications for the audit expectation gap as users may not be able to recognise the 
technical difference in the wording: 
[T]here [i]s a potential scope problem and an expectation gap problem 
[regarding] what we’re doing, what people think we’re signing off on versus what 
we are signing off [on]  
[I9][Emphasis added]. 
4.2.3 Visuals 
 “Other information” may be presented in the form of visuals, such as, tables and 
graphs. A search of current literature resulted in limited findings as to how auditors “review” 
graphs. All interviewees review graphs by going back to the original source to verify the data 
to ensure they reflect the audited financial statements. An interviewee described the process 
of their review, noting that management do make errors pertaining to graphs. This highlights 




[W]e’ll get the client to send us the spreadsheets they’ve created so we can then 
validate the data and make sure the graphs [have] actually been calculated 
correctly and also take into account all of the data they are supposed to take into 
account. We’ve had instances where clients [have] made errors. [Y]ou might have 
a spreadsheet where they’ve taken several rows of data and may have missed a 
row or column  
[I1]. 
 Another interviewee noted some of the challenges when reviewing graphs; the 
following example is evidence of “selectivity” where management deliberately chooses 
certain factors that will portray a favourable result (Jones, 2011; Beattie & Jones, 1997): 
If a company [has] made surpluses over the last couple of years but made losses 
in the previous years, [management] may not want to graph back that far and 
may want to give a breakdown of certain revenue and expenditure streams 
[without] reporting the total to suit their purposes … so it is a difficult area  
[I6]. 
 However, when undergoing a review of graphs/tables, auditors do not “audit” the 
graph but do “review” it for consistency. This is an example of a “limited procedure” the 
IAASB was careful to note. An interviewee stated that: 
We are not passing an opinion on those graphs but we want to make sure that 
they’re consistent  
[I9]. 
 On another note, two interviewees highlighted the concept of “streamlining” whereby: 
 [Management] incorporate accounting policies and notes throughout the 
document as opposed to the traditional primary statements, policies and then 
notes  
[I8]. 
 This “streamlining” concept is becoming increasingly important as Integrated 
Reporting is likely to encourage this trend. As a result, the use of visuals, such as graphs, 
tables and photographs, is likely to increase: 
We [auditors] do take a look at [visuals]… a part of streamlining is to use more 
visual information as part of your presentation  
[I4]. 
 If visuals will be used more prominently throughout financial reports, regulatory 
guidelines should be put into place as they are prone to manipulation (Beattie & Jones, 1997) 
(see section 2.1.3 for review of visuals).  
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4.2.1.2.2 Web documents 
 One interviewee is aware of the risks associated with web documents. ISA 720 
(revised) states that the auditor has no responsibility under this ISA to “search” for “other 
information” (including information on the entity’s website), nor perform any procedures to 
confirm that “other information” is appropriately displayed (see ISA (revised), paragraph 
A19): 
[T]here is a risk now in audits that entities [using the] electronic medium … can 
post reports that we aren’t aware of. [T]he annual report for example, could go 
up with the financial statements and our audit opinion and they may choose to 
supplement that with other information. If it’s not directly related to the financial 
statements or part of the preparation of the financial statements and the 
representations that we’ve received on those statements from the directors, we 
wouldn’t do a lot of extra work on other documents  
[I6]. 
 The same interviewee provided an example of how web documents may have an 
impact on the audited financial statements: 
We audit some irrigation companies and it’s possible they could have a report 
from Environmental Canterbury saying that they’ve breached some terms of their 
consent… that would have potential financial impacts. [W]hat we wouldn’t want 
to see is information being put out that… may not in itself relate directly to the 
annual report but could have significant financial implications [if it’s not 
balanced] 
[I6]. 
 All interviewees acknowledged the difficulties surrounding web documents due to the 
lack of control once they are uploaded:  
Once the financial statements are uploaded to the website, we’ve got really no 
control over it so a client can add reports around the financials once they are 
uploaded that we haven’t seen  
[I9]. 
 It seems that the ISA 720 (revised) remains unchanged with regard to web documents 
not being considered “other information”. However, ISA 720 (revised) acknowledges the 
website as a possible distribution mechanism (see revised ISA 720, paragraph A4 and A19) 
but unless the documents clearly make up the annual report, auditors do not appear to have 




 A challenge auditors face is the timing of “other information”. The “other 
information” to be published in the annual report is often not available until the late stages of 
the audit: 
[Q]uite often, you’ll be auditing the financial statements and coming to the 
conclusion of  the audit of those statements but [management] will still be 
pulling together the “other information” which is going in the annual report… 
you tend to get that quite late and it’s making sure that you build in enough time 
to allow you to go through that information and be able to pass comments back 
[so] that the client then has time to update or correct things  
[I1]. 
 The ability of an auditor to influence management to make changes to “other 
information” once the audit report has been issued is significantly reduced, unless the auditor 
threatens to withdraw the audit report, which is a “big call” for an auditor to make and is 
hardly ever required in practice. Thus, the level of tolerance for “material inconsistencies” 
will be higher if “other information” is made available after the issue of the audit report rather 
than before the report is issued (OAG, 2013). “Other information” is typically provided to the 
auditors at a late stage of the audit of the financial statements but this will have to change if 
auditors are expected to do more work on the “other information”: 
One of the things that some directors or management maybe haven’t realised is 
that in the new [audit report standard] we are required to put a statement in [the 
audit report] to reflect that we’ve actually read that “other information” and if 
we haven’t, because it wasn’t ready, we need to have a statement saying that we 
haven’t read the “other information” on the basis [that] it wasn’t ready  
[I7]. 
 An interviewee notes that the new audit report standard will require management to 
prepare the commentary at an earlier date to ensure the annual report is complete on the day 
auditors sign their opinion:  
[H]istorically a lot of companies have the [audited] financial statements but they 
don’t actually write… the chairman’s report and all that other commentary until 
later … it can be a couple of months after you sign your opinion on the financial 
statements and even in some cases release that to the stock exchange before you 
do the annual report.  So we’re now saying to them, you realise that you’ve got to 
have your document ready to go on the day we sign our opinion, and so it actually 




 ISA 720 (revised) sees an expanded scope and work effort involved with the “other 
information”. Perhaps the ISA 720 (revised) should require auditors to communicate this to 
their clients early in the audit planning phase to ensure the “other information” is received in 
a timely manner (e.g., via the engagement letter).  
4.2.1.3 Definition of “inconsistencies” 
 ISA 720 defines “inconsistency” as “other information” that contradicts information 
contained in the audited financial statements” (see extant ISA 720, paragraph 5(b)). ISA 720 
(revised) extends this definition to “include information that is incorrect, unreasonable or 
inappropriate; or is presented in a way that omits or obscures information that is necessary to 
properly understand the matter being address in other information” (see exposure draft, 
paragraph 9(a)). The inclusion of these concepts expands the definition and interpretation of 
the term “inconsistency” well beyond its meaning generally accepted by most people and has 
strayed far from the current ISA 720’s meaning.  
 Determining what constitutes being “unreasonable” or “inappropriate”, or whether 
something has been omitted from, or otherwise obscured in, requires a high level of 
professional judgement. These items may be difficult for practitioners to identify. However, 
omitting information that is expected to influence the economic decisions of the users for 
whom the auditor’s report is prepared can potentially seriously mislead users. Thus, it is 
considered beneficial to include the concept of omission in the definition of “inconsistency”. 
This new definition implies that the auditor should assess the “completeness” of the “other 
information” which conveys the idea that the auditor is required to evaluate assertions in the 
“other information” that could be partially or completely unrelated to the financial 
statements. Depending on the nature of the “other information”, the auditors’ understanding 
of it and what it might take for it to be considered “complete” adds another layer of 
complexity and subjectivity to the practicality of the standard.  
 Interviewees saw a need for a high level of “expertise” in order to identify 
“omissions”: 
Everything relies on expertise. You have to be an expert to do it. You need 
industry knowledge to make sure it makes sense. [W]hen you’re the audit partner 
and you’re signing off on things, the guys can go through the audit and make sure 
that everything  that’s sitting in there agrees to things [in the financial 
statements] but there could be something environmental that’s happening that 
should be in the accounts that the client’s not going to prepare a piece of paper 
for. That relies on you to understand what’s going on in the industry  
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[I8].   
 Another interviewee also emphasised the importance of having expertise: 
Auditors are appointed to clients typically on the basis of their experience … for 
example, I won’t audit a bank or financial institutions because I don’t have 
experience in that and I won’t audit insurance companies because I just don’t 
know enough about the industry to be able to properly identify all the potential 
issues  
[I5]. 
 On the other hand, yet another interviewee remarked: 
Very seldom is the other information more complex than the financial statements. 
It can be industry specific… but it’s generally not that complex  
[I6]  
 This then, presents the risk of inconsistency in practice and leads to questions over the 
work effort and conclusions reached by different auditors. This could diminish the 
comparability of audit reports and detract from the value of such reported to users. The 
definition of “inconsistency” and the phrase “inconsistency between other information” (in 
ISA 720 (revised)) seem to be unclear while the concepts of “material misstatement of fact” 
from ISA 720 seem to be clearer. The terms used in ISA 720’s (revised) definition of 
inconsistency appear too subjective to be applied effectively and consistently in practice. The 
current ISA 720’s definition on “inconsistency” appears to be more clearly defined as 
“information that contradicts information in the audited financial statements” which clearly 
explains the basis of comparison to “other information”. More importantly, the primary 
objective of the auditor’s responsibilities for “other information” (i.e., consistency with the 
audited financial statements) is arguably better reflected. 
4.2.1.4 Work effort 
 The meaning of “inconsistency” has shifted between the extant and revised standard, 
moving from a difference between “the other information and the audited financial 
statements” to an “inaccuracy in the other information due to a difference identified by the 
auditor between the other information  and the auditor’s understanding of the entity and its 
environment acquired during the audit”. This was seen as reasonable and understandable to 
the auditor’s interviewed as it is consistent with the current terminology used in ISA 315 
Identifying and Assessing the Risks of Material Misstatement through Understanding the 
Entity and Its Environment. It is evident that auditors do a great deal more than what is 
already required of them under ISA 720 (see section 5.1.2): 
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On the information contained next to the financial statements, what I’ll do is I’ll 
read it, I’m looking through it for anything that I think is inconsistent with what I 
know about the financial statements, [and] about the company  
[I5] [emphasis added]. 
Another interviewee further expresses this notion: 
…what you want to do is check that there is nothing [that] you’ve identified 
during the course of your audit using the bank of knowledge you [have] got that’s 
materially inconsistent with what’s at the front  
[I4] [emphasis added]. 
 An interesting thought expressed by an interviewee was a claim that the standard was 
just putting into words what they have already been doing. This is consistent with Humphrey 
and Moizer (1990) and Humphrey et al., (1993) who argued that audit standards have been 
ineffective and are only articulations of existing auditing practice. 
To be fair, [ISA] 720, it’s not really changing what we’ve been doing for the past 
10 years. We’ve sort of almost self-governed ourselves into a better practice  
[I1]. 
4.2.1.5 Documentation 
I think no matter how you word [ISA 720], the practical issues are the key 
risk…Auditors need to be aware of it… [An] important [issue] that we, as a 
profession, have struggled with is… how we document what we’ve done  
[I6] [emphasis added]. 
 The ISA 720 (revised) includes a new clause with regard to documentation which is a 
problem auditors have struggled with. ISA 720 (revised) states that the auditor shall 
document “the procedures performed under this ISA” (see ISA 720 (revised), paragraph 25). 
The work performed is to “read and consider” (see ISA 720 (revised), paragraph 14) and the 
requirements indicate that auditors must demonstrate “consideration” in their working papers. 
However, there may not be suitable documentation on the audit file to support the detailed 
“consideration” of content presented in “other information”. These requirements will place 
onerous obligations on the auditor, especially where an auditor’s expert is needed to work 
with the financial audit team to confirm there is no material inconsistency in the “other 
information” or “misstatement” in the financial report.  
 To “read and consider” may be interpreted narrowly and assumes that the auditor’s 
understanding of the entity and its environment are documented on the audit file (see ISA 
720, paragraphs 35 and 36). This ignores the fact that electronic audit files are used in today’s 
audit which arguably contain far more information than it is possible for one auditor to have 
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reviewed and understood. There may be information buried in the detail of files which are 
inconsistent with “other information” but it would be unreasonable for the auditor performing 
the review of the “other information” to know this. This “understanding” requirement of the 
auditor could be interpreted as the collective knowledge of the whole audit team, office or 
even the entire audit firm. However, typically, a review of “other information” is performed 
by a partner. It would be impractical for the whole audit team to review the “other 
information” in light of their personal understanding and it would be virtually impossible to 
get any meaningful review done on a firm-wide basis.  
[H]ow we document that we’ve complied with [ISA 720] is actually quite an 
important part of the process because from an audit quality perspective, there has 
been some criticism of the profession. The challenge with this standard is how to 
practically implement [ISA 720] and how you document what you did  
[I6] [emphasis added]. 
4.2.1.6 Responding 
 ISA 720’s objective is for the auditor to respond appropriately when documents 
containing audited financial statements and the auditor’s report thereon include “other 
information” that could undermine the credibility of those financial statements and the 
auditor’s report (see ISA 720, paragraph 4). In addition, ISA 720 (revised) asks auditors to 
state whether the other information is consistent with the audited financial statements among 
other things. However, paragraph 22(c), proposes that the auditor is to state in the audit report 
that she/he “does not express (or will not express) an audit opinion or any form of assurance 
conclusion thereon” (see ISA 720 (revised), paragraph 22(c)). If the “other information” is 
neither audited nor reviewed, how much value can financial statement users and the general 
public place on the auditor’s views on the “other information”? This also has implications of 
the audit expectation gap – will users realise that no assurance has been provided? 
 The revised ISA 720 raises concerns, because the standard potentially requires the 
auditor to either withdraw from the engagement (see paragraph 18(b)). Thereby, ISA 720 
(revised) potentially places the auditor in a position of withdrawing from an engagement 
before issuing the audit report, even if the timing of the receipt of the other information is 
after the fiscal year end but before the report date, based on procedures that do not amount to 
an audit or review and do not actually affect the audit opinion. Is it practical for an auditor to 
consider withdrawing from a financial statement audit over a reporting issue that does not 
affect the financial statement opinion?  
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 With ISA 720 being less stringent relative to other standards, interviewees noted that 
the standard is effective when or if they have identified a misstatement: 
All of these things come into play much more when you [have] got a 
disagreement. When you’ve got a disagreement, what the standard does is 
highlight far more clearly what your responsibilities are and what the course of 
action is that you’re required to take  
[I4]. 
 Another interviewee explained: 
If we really disagreed with it then there are a series of remedies following 
standard 720. In practice, this doesn’t really happen  
[I5]. 
 When the standard is taken literally, as long as the quoted figures mentioned in the 
“other information” are consistent with the audited financial statements, there is no guidance 
for auditors who disagree with the “tone”, because the numbers are consistent: 
It’s very hard for me to say that it’s wrong because as long as the number agrees 
to the financials then where do I go to with that?  
[I9]. 
 A number of the interviewees expressed a concern over the lack of guidance when no 
inconsistencies are identified and the numbers are accurate: 
The words they’re using in those reports are hard to validate. [A]ll you can say is 
“yes” [if] the numbers they’re using are the same as what’s in the audited 
financials. [T]he reasons why we can be comfortable with [saying “yes”], is quite 
a grey area in terms of it [being] consistent with what we’ve found in the audit 
 [I9]. 
 As a result of the lack of guidance, the extent of an auditor’s influence is limited and 
is confined to what the standard states: 
We’re always looking to kind of limit what the exposure will be and make it very 
clear because as an auditor, you can only control what you are told  
[I8]. 
 This implies there is a lack of guidance given to auditors concerning the “tone” of the 
“other information”: 
We often would have discussions with directors for potential changes but at the 
end of the day it’s difficult to get them to change if they don’t want to [I6]; 
There are some practical implications around the wording [of ISA 720] and you 
don’t have the obligation or jurisdiction to tell a CEO how to word something or 
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what graphs they should or shouldn’t put in. The intent is that there [is] no 
misleading information or information that doesn’t align with [what] the financial 
statements are saying  
[I6]. 
 In this situation, another interviewee indicated that the amount of influence they have 
over management is dependent on the relationship with their client: 
I’ll make recommendations to management saying, “You may want to rethink the 
way you worded this, the tone of this may not come across right” and if you’ve 
got a good relationship with your client, they will listen to you. If you’ve got a 
combative relationship with a client then you may need to approach it in a slightly 
different way  
[I1]. 
 Another form of influence auditors can have on management is by referring to 
regulatory publications or standards, due to the lack of guidance for auditors in addressing the 
“tone” of the message management is trying to get across: 
We tend to use or try and link back to publications that the FMA has issued or 
guidance that they have issued, because FMA registers quite high on directors 
radar [because] they don’t want to be answering questions to the FMA. If the 
FMA says this “looks misleading”, that’s not a situation they want to be in. They 
want to be able to say, “No it’s not, because here’s what it means and we’ve 
shown that through this reconciliation”  
[I7]. 
4.2.1.7 Reporting 
 When it comes to reporting, feedback from respondents to the IAASB’s May 2011 
Auditor Reporting Consultation Paper indicated a need for greater transparency about the 
work an auditor undertakes regarding “other information”. ISA 720 (revised) provides 
additional transparency around the auditor’s responsibilities regarding “other information” by 
articulating the auditors’ responsibilities for the “other information” in the audit report (see 
ISA 720 (revised), paragraph 22(a), (b), (c), and (d)).  
 There are concerns about the inclusion of a statement in the auditor’s report regarding 
material inconsistencies with “other information”. The statement: “… we have not audited or 
reviewed the other information…” is likely to reassure readers even though no assurance is 
being provided.  
 The form of the statement “we have not identified any material inconsistencies” (see 
revised ISA 720, page 25) appears to convey a form of positive assurance regardless of the 
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disclaimer language regarding “no audit opinion or review conclusion”.  By including the 
auditor’s conclusion on “other information” in the auditor’s report that is otherwise prepared 
to express an opinion on the audited financial statements, there is a risk that the users of the 
report will expect the “other information” to be subject to the overall opinion expressed on 
the financial statements. This is concerning as it may contribute to the exacerbation of the 
audit expectation gap.  
Referring to the new audit report standards, an interviewee suggested there will be a 
rise in future audit fees. ISA 720 (revised) will require the audit report to include:  
1) A statement that management is responsible for the “other information”;  
2) Identification of the “other information”;  
3) A statement that the auditors opinion does not cover the “other information”; and 
4) A description of the auditor’s responsibilities relating to reading, considering and 
reporting on the “other information”. 
 While this provides additional transparency, auditors are now in a vulnerable position 
and may feel the need to take precautions in how they translate their responsibilities in the 
audit report. As a result, this puts more onus on auditors to ensure they have read and 
considered the “other information”. 
An audit opinion will take more time to conduct and there will be more fees 
required for that, there’s more work that’s done… [Up to now we] may notify 
things to the directors but now if we’re putting it in a public document to the 
shareholders, more thought will have to  go in there  
[I8]. 
 However, auditors are already facing challenges with the reporting requirements in 
the current standard: 
I worry sometimes about what people think we’re signing-off on and we get into 
debates with our clients about the wording of our report … [and] what words we 
use to tell  people what we’ve done and what we haven’t done. It’s very 
complicated  
[I9]. 
It is perhaps best, in the public’s interest, to communicate the roles that management 
and auditors have with respect to “other information”. The public’s interest would be served 
by expanding the requirements of both the management’s and the auditor’s responsibilities 
sections of the audit report to explain their respective responsibilities for the “other 
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information”. The description should clearly indicate the primary purpose of the procedures 
carried out by the auditor (i.e., credibility of the financial statements and auditor’s report). 
Furthermore, the auditor’s report could also include a description of management’s 
responsibilities with respect to the preparation and presentation of the other information. 
These changes would enable users of the financial statements to put the auditor’s and 
management’s respective duties over “other information” into perspective. At present, there 
is a lack of a management framework that sets out management’s responsibilities over “other 
information”. 
In summary, some aspects of ISA 720 are already seen as challenging for auditors in 
practice. After analysing the interview findings, it is evident that ISA 720 (revised) will lead 
to even more complications in practice. This finding suggests that, while the revision of ISA 
720 was to align auditors’ responsibilities in regard to the “other information” with users’ 
expectations, it appears that it is not practical for auditors to “audit” the “other information”. 
Thus, ISA 720 (revised) seems to be more of a drawback than beneficial for auditors. 
4.2.1.8 Integrated Reporting  
 IR is a relatively new concept as it was established by the IIRC in 2011. Currently, the 
standard, both current and revised versions, do not have any references to IR. When 
questioning the interviewees about IR, the general view upheld was uncertainty and the 
reliance on experts may rise as IR encompasses sustainability aspects which auditors do not 
have the necessary expertise to pass judgement: 
I’m not sure where [IR is] going to go, we might, as auditors, need to start 
bringing in experts from other fields to make sure we can confirm the other parts 
of the [“other information”] is [correct]and accurate  
[I6]. 
 Furthermore, for auditors to provide assurance on IR is dependent on the market and 
whether there is a demand for it; it is not prominent in New Zealand: 
[In an] integrated report… companies are trying… [to] use their financial 
statements to convey more information and it can be certified.  [H]owever, it’s not 
compulsory at the moment… so it’s got to be market driven as to what the market 
wants to see 
[I8]. 




4.3 Implications on the audit expectation gap 
 As mentioned in Chapter 2, due to the scope of this study, this study focuses on the 
performance gap (see section 2.3.1.2). As the study did not elicit the views of regulators or 
users, thus, not all aspects of the expectation gap can be assessed. 
 
Figure 3: Components of the performance gap (adapted from Porter, 1993) 
 All interviewees were well aware and conscious of the audit expectation gap in 
performing their duties. However, interviewees’ perceptions of users’ expectations regarding 
their duties with regard to “other information” varied. One interviewee’s perception was: 
They think we [auditors] look at every single dollar and cent in a set of financial 
statements and they don’t appreciate what materiality means and statistical 
sampling…there is a real expectations gap in terms of what we are doing versus 
what the public think we are doing  
[I1].  
 In stark contrast, another interviewee’s perception was: 
 I suspect they think you’ve done nothing  
[I4]. 
 The above interview finding provides evidence of auditors’ awareness of the audit 
expectation gap issue. In particular, they allude to the “reasonableness gap” – a gap between 















Audit expectation gap 
54 
 
4.3.1 Auditors role and the audit expectation gap 
 As noted above, actual practices go beyond what the current ISA 720 requires them to 
(see section 5.1.2). An interviewee explains the expectations from management: 
The expectations of the board are probably more on us these days and I quite 
often get this, “I’ve assumed you guys have read the full document”… from the 
directors… that’s probably an expectation gap in terms of what they expect us to 
be doing versus what we’re legally bound to do  
[I1].  
 Another interviewee felt the same expectation: 
What you’re required to do is read the “other information”. Some clients may get 
you to check all [of the annual report] for them but your only obligation is to read 
it and to check whether there are any material inconsistencies with [audited] 
financial information  
[I4]. 
 Interestingly, the above interview findings and sections 4.11 and 4.1.2 show that 
auditors have been exceeding the requirements of ISA 720 and carry out duties above the 
requirement that’s reasonably expected of auditors on a cost-benefit basis. For example, 
auditors are not required by ISA 720 to check the entire annual report but management 
perceive this to be a reasonable duty for auditors on a cost-benefit basis (Porter, 1993).  
 The change in ISA 720 objective puts a focus on inconsistencies with the auditor’s 
understanding of the entity and its environment. Even prior to the revision of ISA 720, 
interview findings show auditors considered whether a material inconsistency exists with 
their understanding of the entity (see section 5.2.1.4). This is evidence that audit standards are 
lagging in the auditing profession identifying and responding to public expectations 
(Humphrey, 1992). The above analysis provides substantial evidence that implicates the 
standard setters as having contributed to a widening of the audit expectation gap, in particular 
the “deficient standards” component identified and defined by Porter (1993). This also 
suggests that principles-based standards may be more prone to inconsistent applications in 
practice compared with a prescriptive approach as it involves judgement.  
 In 2008/9, AG-4 underwent a revision (to AG-4 (revised)) to better reflect the 
increased interest in the public sector in improving the quality of external service 
performance reports to reflect the management of performance and actual achievements by 
the entity being audited (OAG, 2010): 
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[T]he Auditor General … was concerned to see that performance reporting and 
the audit of performance reporting really hadn’t kept pace with change, so she 
had a big drive to bring reporting in the sector up to a higher level and to make 
sure that we applied similar principles in relation to performance reporting as we 
did with financials  
[I2]. 
 This shows that the Auditor-General was aware of the changing reporting 
environment in the public sector as the standard needed to be revised to better reflect the 
change. In addition, AG-4 was revised and implemented faster than ISA 720 (revised). Thus, 
the private sector is lagging more than the public sector in responding to public expectations 
(Humphrey, 1992).  
 In summary, auditors are aware of their duties and responsibilities under ISA 720, and 
perceive that they are doing well beyond what ISA 720 requires them to.  Thus, research 
question one confirms the existence of deficient standards.   
4.3.2 Impact RQ2 on the audit expectation gap  
 ISA 720 lacks a definitive framework for auditors to perform work on “other 
information”. This leads to difficulties when the auditor needs to consider the consistency 
between “other information”, the financial statements, and the auditor’s knowledge obtained 
during the course of the audit. In addition, any indication of judgement being required in ISA 
720 suggests that, in practice, there will be some difference between individual auditors 
(although not necessarily systematically between firms). The revised standard introduces 
significant judgement around what auditors might be reasonably expected to know (arising 
from the audit) and introduces subjectivity around the level of precision with which that 
knowledge is to be applied. Furthermore, this can be attributed to “deficient performance” 
component of the performance gap: 
I read a lot of annual reports by various firms and … if we’d been reading that, 
we may have made some suggestions around the way they’ve worded things. So I 
certainly see some items out there which I wouldn’t want to see in an annual 
report  
[I1]. 
 Another interviewee was aware of the subjectivity from one auditor to another: 
[It’s a matter of] my professional judgement versus another auditors’ professional 
judgement versus an auditor at another firm’s professional judgement  
[I9].  
 Another interviewee raised the subjectivity issue with ISA 720: 
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… because you look at the word “material inconsistencies”, “misstatement of 
fact”, [you ask yourself at] “what point is it a misstatement of fact [that is] going 
to undermine the credibility [of the financial statements?”… there is a lot of 
judgement around its interpretation …  
[I4]. 
 A reason for this inconsistency in practice may be attributed to the ambiguity in the 
standard and as a result, auditors are unable to fulfil the role and responsibilities expected by 
the public (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2007). Thereby, ambiguity in audit pronouncements is a 
cause of the “performance gap” (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2007). To emphasise the ambiguity of 
the standard, there are mixed views as to the clarity of ISA 720: 
[It is a] short, brief, concise, [and a] clear standard  
[I5]. 
 In stark contrast: 
I don’t think it’s that clear at the moment … while it might, on the face of it seem 
clear, I don’t think there’s actual clarity around what we are required to sign-off 
on and what words we are required to include in our opinion…  
[I7]. 
 In summary, the interview findings provided notable evidence of the subjectivity and 
ambiguity of ISA 720 (revised) for practice. There is subjectivity within the current ISA 720 
but is to a lesser extent. Research question two confirms the existence of deficient 
performance.  
4.4 Summary 
As shown in this chapter, all interviewees understood the impact the “other 
information” has on the audited financial statements and thus, they assume responsibility for 
considering the “other information”. The interviewees also perceive their roles with respect to 
the “other information” as being, to some extent, beyond what was required by ISA 720. 
Furthermore, interviewees identified their primary role as being to ensure the “other 
information” does not undermine the credibility of the audited financial statements. 
The revision of ISA 720 can be explained as the auditing profession trying to keep 
pace with users’ expectations and the constantly changing reporting environment. The 
research evidence presented in this chapter highlights the standard’s inherent ambiguity, 
subjectivity, inconsistencies, and deficiencies. This is due to the nature of the “other 
information” and the complexities that are associated with them which makes it difficult for 
auditors to assume responsibilities concerning the “other information. As a result, the 
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shortcomings of ISA 720 (revised) contribute to the existence of the “performance gap”, and 
specifically to both the deficient performance and deficient standards components.  
The next chapter discusses the findings in this chapter in relation to the knowledge 
gaps identified in Chapter 2, and the interview findings on the theoretical and practical 




Chapter 5 – Discussion 
 Chapter 4 presented the findings gathered from interviews. This chapter will discuss 
the findings with respect to current literature, and identifies theoretical and practical 
implications. 
5.1 Current literature 
 The purpose for the revision of ISA 720 was to “serve the public interest” (IAASB, 
2015) and the accounting profession has a stated obligation to serve the public interest 
(ICANZ, 2003). To test this, van Peursem et al., (2005) examined the “Going Concern” audit 
standard and was expecting to see if their “expanded” obligation had an impact on practice. 
Contrary to their expectations, they found that the audit standard did not convey a forceful 
mandate on the auditor. Thus, indicating that “expanded” standards “give the appearance of 
improving profession benchmarks by virtue of greater volume, a volume not necessarily 
commensurate with a greater quality or a more forceful mandate” (p. 128). This is confirmed 
with the revision of ISA 720 as the number of pages went from 10 to 102 and the application 
and other explanatory material in particular, went from 2 to 90 pages. The public interest is 
for auditors to provide assurance on the “other information”. It is seen in Chapter 2, coupled 
with the interview findings, that only limited changes were made, which may be inadequate 
to “serve the public interest” (IAASB, 2015).  
 There are commentators who see the promulgating of auditing standards as a means 
of self-regulating professional body members in order to serve the public interest (Baker, 
2004; Carmichael, 1995; Sikka, Willmott, & Lowe, 1989; Willmott, 1986). However, some 
have seen the accountancy bodies unable to serve the public interest and protect public 
confidence, as auditing standard-setters are thought to be acting in the interest of the 
accounting profession, rather than the public (McEnroe & Martens, 1998; Pong & 
Whittington, 1994; Sikka et al., 1989). In addition, Sikka (2002) expressed that the audit 
standard-setters seem to not owe a duty of care to any stakeholder, despite the fact that they 
are meant to serve the public interest. The interview findings reveal that auditors are currently 
doing more than what is required by ISA 720 (see section 4.2.1.4) by considering whether a 
material inconsistency exists between the “other information” and the auditor’s knowledge 
obtained in the audit (see ISA 720 (revised), paragraph 11(b)). The findings pointed out that 
ISA 720 (revised) was not changing what auditors do in practice, that the standards are just 
articulating existing practices (Tricker, 1980).  
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 One of the IAASB’s goals in the revising of ISA 720 was to increase the value of the 
audit, without changing its scope. However, this study saw an increase in the scope within 
ISA 720, from documents “containing” the audited financial statements to those 
“accompanying” the statements. In parallel, work effort will also increase as auditors must 
remain alert for indications that the “other information” may appear to be materially 
misstated as required by ISA 720 (revised). This will contribute to the work effort required by 
the auditor to discuss with management as to which documents comprises the annual report.  
 “Inconsistency” is defined by the ISA 720 as “other information” which contradicts 
the information contained in audited financial statements (see paragraph 5(b)). ISA 720 
(revised) extends this definition to “include information that is incorrect, unreasonable or 
inappropriate; or is presented in a way that omits or obscures information that is necessary to 
properly understand the matter being addressed in the “other information” (see exposure draft 
on the revised ISA 720, paragraph 9(a)). The inclusion of these concepts arguably expands 
the definition and interpretation of the term “inconsistency” well beyond the meaning 
generally accepted by most people and has strayed far from the current ISA 720’s meaning. 
These items may be difficult for practitioners to identify as this requires a high level of 
professional judgement. The interview findings emphasised the importance of having 
expertise, and notes that auditors are appointed to clients on the basis of their expertise. Thus, 
having expertise allows auditors to assess the concept of omission as materiality/disclosure 
judgements are affected by experience (Messier, 1983).  
 Furthermore, this new definition of “inconsistency” implies that the auditor should 
assess the “completeness” of the “other information” which conveys the idea that the auditor 
is required to evaluate assertions in the “other information” that could be partially or 
completely unrelated to the financial statements. Depending on the nature of the “other 
information”, the auditor’s understanding of it, and what it might take for it to be considered 
“complete”, adds another layer of complexity and subjectivity to the practicality of the 
standard. Consequently, the risk of inconsistency in practice leads to questions over the work 
effort and conclusions reached by different auditors. In addition, this confirms Haniffa and 
Hudaib’s (2007) notion of a performance gap arising from auditors being unable to fulfil their 
roles and responsibilities due to the ambiguity of the standard. 
 Prior research highlighted that little is known about (if at all) auditors review graphs 
as part of their review of the “other information (Clatworthy & Jones, 2006). This study 
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reveals that auditors review graphs by going to the original source of data (e.g., spreadsheets) 
to verify the completeness and validity of the data with the financial statements to ensure a 
true and fair presentation. In some instances, auditors have found errors whereby 
management have overlooked rows or columns. This confirms “selectivity” with graphs and 
how they can be manipulated to portray favourable results (Jones, 2011; Beattie and Jones, 
1997). This issue will continue to be exacerbated due to the development of “streamlining” 
which encourages the use of visuals (see section 4.2.3).  
 Previous research noted potential problems with IFR including, importantly, 
information quality (Jones & Xiao, 2004). This study confirms this issue, as auditors 
expressed their concerns over the lack of control and monitoring they have concerning web 
documents. An interviewee stated that once the audited financial statements are uploaded, 
they have no control over them. Currently, ISA 720 excludes web documents from being 
reviewed by the auditor, but as a recalibration of the standard, web documents may now fall 
within the scope of the standard, as the annual report may be made available to users 
electronically through the entity’s website (see ISA 720 (revised), paragraph A4) and 
electronic information to be considered may accompany the financial statements. ISA 720 
(revised) only acknowledges the Internet as a distribution mechanism and web documents. 
However, its overall stance remains unchanged and the IAASB has taken a cautious attitude 
concerning web documents. This confirms Fisher and Naylor’s (2016) suggestion of an 
unmet demand for web documents to be audited.   
 Two important findings relating to the challenges auditors are facing when 
considering the “other information” are the timing of the “other information” and how 
auditors respond when material inconsistencies are not identified, yet the auditor disagrees 
with some aspect of the message such as its tone. “Other information” is not available until 
the late stages of the audit. If auditors are expected to do more work concerning the “other 
information”, due to the increase in scope and work effort required by the revised standard, 
“other information” will need to be made available to audit earlier in the audit. The interview 
findings express this concern as auditors need adequate time to review and consider the 
“other information”. If the “other information is made available after the issue of the audit 
report, the tolerance level for material inconsistencies will be higher (OAG, 2013), thus, the 
likelihood of fraud is higher (Brazel et al., 2009). This is clearly not in the interest of users.  
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 The second concerns difficulties the auditors face in responding when no material 
inconsistencies are identified. For example, when the numbers in the “other information” are 
able to be reconciled back to the audited financial statements; yet the auditor disagrees with 
the tone of the message. ISA 720 (both current and revised versions) does not provide 
guidance when this situation arises. Thus, an ill-intentioned message may get published in the 
annual report which may undermine the credibility of the audited financial statements. As 
ISA 720 does not provide guidance one interviewee sought guidance from regulatory 
publications or standards which could then be used to get management to reconsider the 
message.  
 The degree of subjectivity within ISA 720 has been identified as a concern by the 
interview findings and the prior literature. Emerging types of reporting, such as IR, will 
exacerbate many of these problems. For instance, the scope of information, work effort 
required and the definition of “material inconsistencies”, are all associated with a high level 
of ambiguity in relation to IR (Humphrey, O’Dwyer, & Unerman, 2014). Power (1997) notes 
that auditors are not expected to have the level of detailed knowledge and experience of 
experts, although the auditor is obliged to form an opinion on the need for specialist 
knowledge and on the expert’s competence and objectivity. Thus, the findings raise the 
question of whether auditors will have a greater reliance on the work of experts. 
5.2 Theoretical implications 
 Regarding theoretical implications, this research suggests the existence of the 
performance gap and its two components. It is clear from this research that ISA 720 is 
ambiguous and is subjective as to the scope, definition, and the extent of attentiveness 
required of the auditor. Due to the ambiguity within ISA 720, auditors are unable to fulfil 
their role well, representing a deficiency of the standard. Prior literature has already 
confirmed the existence of deficient standards in relation to ISA 720 at a high level (Porter et 
al., 2012). In addition, research question one confirms the existence of deficient standards as 
auditors are doing more than what they are required to in certain areas. This suggests that 
having auditors review “other information” is seen as “reasonable” on a cost-benefit basis 
(Porter et al., 2012).  
 Research evidence also confirms deficient performance that is, performance below 
professional standards (Akinbuli, 2010), due to the degree of subjectivity and within the 
standard. The finding is consistent with Clatworthy and Jones (2006) and Fisher and Naylor 
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(2016). Forexample, an interviewee noted that while reading an annual report which had been 
audited by another firm, the interviewee saw items he would not have included. In addition, 
one interviewee stated that the ISA 720 was clear and concise while in stark contrast, another 
interviewee stated that the standard was not clear.  
 As discussed in Fisher and Naylor (2016), many recurring issues initially appear in 
the expectation gap as part of the “reasonableness gap”, then gradually shifting into the 
“performance gap” (deficient standards and deficient performance). The development of ISA 
720 to ISA 720 (revised) confirms this movement. The reasonableness gap is alluded to in 
Bedard et al., (2012) where investors, both professional and non-professional, thought the 
“other information” was audited when it was in fact not. Consequently, deficient standards 
arise as society perceives auditors to be able to do more in terms of evaluating the “other 
information” on a cost-benefit basis. The current ISA 720 is seen to be subjective 
(Clatworthy & Jones, 2006; Fisher & Naylor, 2016) which leads to inconsistent practices, 
thus confirming deficient performance.  
 As a result of ISA 720 (revised), it is seen to be even more subjective as auditors will 
be required to identify material inconsistencies not only, between the “other information” and 
audited financial statements, but also with their knowledge obtained in the audit. Moreover, 
the revision confirms that auditing standards are only articulations of current practices 
(Humphrey & Moizer, 1990) as auditors are currently doing a great deal beyond what is 
required.  
5.3 Practical implications 
 The cumulative changes made to extant ISA 720 may increase the risk of unintended 
consequences. From the findings and analysis of the standard, some liability-related risks are 
identified below. 
 First, ISA 720 (revised) imposes uncertain and ambiguous obligations on auditors 
with respect to information accompanying the financial statements and because the auditor’s 
obligations are not clearly defined, users of the financial statements may not understand the 
limited scope and extent of the auditor’s role. Thereby, it may lead to exaggerated 
expectations of the auditor’s responsibilities and confusion over the company’s responsibility 
for its own financial statements and other disclosures. Such uncertainty not only undermines 
the clarity of the existing corporate reporting model — in which companies are responsible 
for their own disclosures — but also risks imposing incremental liability on auditors. 
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 Second, the above risk is exacerbated by the fact that the extant ISA 720 reflects a 
relatively more objective standard (i.e., is there anything in the company’s disclosure that is 
inconsistent with the financial statements?), whereas the revised ISA 720 is more subjective 
(i.e., does the auditor believe or is aware of anything that is gathered from the audit that 
might be in tension with the company’s disclosures?). This may give rise to unwarranted 
attempts to hold the auditor liable for issues contained in the “other information”.  
 Third, with the incorporation of “omissions” into the concept of materiality, auditors 
may not be best placed to identify these omissions or have the extent of knowledge to do so. 
However, by virtue of the standard, auditors could potentially be held responsible for 
subsequent omissions not detected in “other information”. 
 Fourth, ISA 720 (revised) includes a new clause with regard to documentation. The 
problematic nature of this requirement for auditors was confirmed in the interview findings. 
ISA 720 (revised) states that the auditor shall document “the procedures performed under this 
ISA” (see paragraph 25). The work performed is to “read and consider” (see paragraph 14) 
and documentation requirements must demonstrate “consideration”. However, what 
constitutes suitable documentation of “consideration” is again problematic. These 
requirements will place onerous obligations on the auditor, especially where an auditor’s 
expert is needed to work with the financial audit team to confirm there is no material 
inconsistency in the “other information” or “misstatement” in the financial report.  
5.4 Summary 
 In summary, this chapter discusses the interview findings presented in Chapter 4. The 
findings aim to fill the gaps in knowledge that was identified in Chapter 2, and discussed 




Chapter 6 – Conclusion 
 In a review of current literature, gaps in knowledge relating to auditors’ 
responsibilities for “other information” were identified (see Chapter 2). Based on these gaps, 
this study aimed to investigate how auditors audit the “other information” during the audit of 
financial statements. This research aimed to fill the knowledge gaps and, in addition, 
contribute to the relevant current literature, theory, policy and practice. This chapter is 
organised into three sections: 1) summary of the research questions; 2) contributions to 
literature; and 3) recommended future research.   
6.1 Summary of research questions 
6.1.1 Research question one  
What do auditors perceive to be their role and responsibility for “other information” 
while auditing financial statements? 
 From the interview findings, it found that auditors perceive their role as doing more 
than what the ISA 720 requires. All interviewees identified their primary role as ensuring the 
credibility of the audited financial statements. Thus, they recognise the importance of the 
“other information” and assumed responsibility to identify, if any, material inconsistencies 
exists between the “other information” and audited financial statements.  
 While the interviewees stated that ISA 720 ensures that they read the “other 
information, several interviewees commented on the positive implications of ISA 720 on 
management. For example, since ISA 720 requires auditors to read and consider the “other 
information”, it is a signal given to management or those charged with governance that such 
information is important to report users. Thus, they have seen an improvement in the quality 
of “other information” as it is now clearer that it is being scrutinised.  
6.1.2 Research question two 
How does ISA 720 (both the current and revised versions) affect practice and what 
challenges do auditors face in implementing its requirements? 
 Currently, ISA 720 is found to be subjective (Clatworthy & Jones, 2006; Fisher & 
Naylor, 2016). Through the revision of the standard, ISA 720 (revised) appears to be more 
subjective than its predecessor and the interview findings and a review of ISA 720 confirms 
65 
 
this. The increase in subjectivity can be attributed to four main changes: 1) objective; 2) 
scope; 3) definitions; and 4) work effort (see Appendix 3 for summary of changes).  
1. Objective – ISA 720 (revised) makes further references and requires auditors to 
consider whether a material inconsistency exists between the “other information” and 
audited financial statements and in additional to the auditor’s knowledge obtained in 
the audit; 
2. Scope – scope has expanded from the “other information” in documents “containing” 
the audited financial statements to the “other information” that “accompanies” the 
statements; 
3. Definitions – “inconsistencies” has extended to include information that is incorrect, 
unreasonable, inappropriate, or is presented in a way that omits or obscures 
information; and 
4. Work effort – requires auditors to determine which documents comprise the annual 
report and remain alert for indications that the “other information” may appear to be 
materially misstated. 
 From the interview findings, three challenging areas were highlighted in relation to 
ISA 720: 1) timing of the “other information”; 2) responding when no material 
inconsistencies are identified but the auditor still has concerns; and 3) web documents.  
1. Timing – it is important that auditors receive “other information” in a timely manner 
to ensure adequate audit work is completed as the “other information” is typically 
received in the late stages of an audit. This will have to change if auditors are now 
required to do more work on it;  
2. Responding  when no material inconsistencies are identified– insufficient guidelines 
are provided when auditors are in the scenario where the numbers are able to be 
reconciled from the “other information” back to the audited financial statements but 
the auditor disagrees with the “tone” of the message; 
3. Web documents – they are difficult to monitor once they have been uploaded onto the 
entity’s website. Any supplementary information that is uploaded may have the note 
of “other information and have impact on the audited financial statements. However, 




6.1.3 Research question three 
What are the implications of the findings for the audit expectation gap? 
 Research question one confirms the existence of deficient standards – the difference 
between what auditors are reasonably expected to do by society and what the standards 
prescribe them to do (Porter, 1993). The interview findings confirm deficient standards as 
auditors felt the expectation from management to review the entire annual report as 
management see that it is a reasonable task as auditors have audited the financial statements 
and should be able to generate an understanding of the entity. In addition, this expectation 
requires auditors to do more than what is prescribed in ISA 720, thus, further contributing to 
the deficient standards.  
 Research question two confirms deficient performance – the failure of auditors to 
perform up to the reasonable responsibilities expected by society (Porter, 1993). Due to the 
subjectivity within ISA 720, individual auditors will have varying interpretations of the 
standard as to what is required, the extent and attentiveness required of them. This will lead 
to inconsistent practices amongst auditors (although not necessarily systematically between 
firms) and the perception that auditors are unable to meet society’s expectations.  
6.2 Contributions to literature 
 The contributions of this study can be attributed to current literature and to qualitative 
audit research and is discussed below: 
6.2.1 Contributions to current literature 
 The current literature is scant of the topic on how auditors consider the “other 
information” during the audit of financial statements. Clatworthy and Jones (2006) noted that 
while the audit firm they contacted, read the “other information” to ensure the numbers were 
reconcilable with the audited financial statements, the firm had no specific guidance on how 
auditors’ should consider narratives, potentially creating much subjectivity [see their footnote 
2]. Furthermore, the views from senior auditors have never been elicited on their roles and 
responsibilities pertaining to the “other information”. Hence, little was known about their 
perceptions of this aspect of current audit practice and the challenges it presents. This 
research bridges the gap in knowledge previously identified in literature and enhances our 
understanding of a topic that has been under reserach.  
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 In particular, this study has contributed to fill the knowledge gaps identified in 
Chapter 2 and is presented in Chapter 5 and is briefly summarised below. Regarding the 
“other information”, such as the Chairman’s statement and MD&A, auditors review this 
“other information” to ensure it is consistent with the audited financial statements. In 
addition, if management have quoted figures, they must be reconcilable back to the audited 
financial statements. Clatworthy and Jones (2006) notes that it is not known how, or if, 
graphs are considered by auditors in the review of the “other information”. Interview findings 
reveal that auditors reconcile the source of data (e.g., spreadsheets) to the annual report to 
ensure it is consistent. However, auditors do not have the authority to tell management how 
to present graphs as long as the numbers are able to be reconciled back to the audited 
financial statements. Thus, graphs are still subject to potential manipulation through 
measurement distortion and presentational enhancement (Jones, 2011). 
 Little has changed in regard to auditor’s responsibilities for web documents. ISA 720 
(revised) acknowledges the web as a distribution mechanism or annual reports but does not 
consider web documents as the “other information”. Thus, it is not subject to a review by an 
auditor unless they are uploaded with the audited financial statements. Interview findings 
reveal the difficulties in reviewing web documents, and hence, the cautious approach taken 
by the profession. Once the audited financial statement have been uploaded, supplementary 
information may be uploaded and it is difficult for auditors to monitor this information which 
may have a potential impact on the audited statements. It is seen as a difficult and grey area 
for auditors. 
 With respect to IR, it is likely that IR will exacerbate many of the issues identified in 
this research. IR will blur the distinction between the “other information” and audited 
financial statements as it is integrated as part of the IR framework. Thus, the auditors 
interviewed are uncertain of the direction IR will being. However, IR has yet to be widely 
adopted in New Zealand and assurance on IR has to be market driven in order for auditors to 
assume responsibility for them. The possibility of a greater reliance on experts may arise to 
provide an opinion outside an auditor’s expertise.  
 This research has confirmed the performance gap – the difference between that is 
reasonably expected by society, and what is perceived to be achieved (Porter, 1993). Hanniffa 
and Hudaib (2007), states that when auditors are unable to meet the roles and responsibilities 
expected by society, it is often due to the ambiguity of standards. The review of ISA 720, 
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coupled with interview findings, confirms the ambiguity and subjectivity within the standard. 
Thus, it gives rise to the performance gap portion of the audit expectation gap. Furthermore, 
its two components have been confirmed (see 6.1.3). 
6.2.2 Contributions to qualitative audit research  
 Chapters 1 and 2 presented the rationale for conducting this research. Beattie et al., 
(2001) and Power (2003) have criticised the current approach to audit research which is 
largely quantitative-based and focuses on testing the validity of hypotheses. For this reason, 
research is strongly encouraged in a way to better understand the realities of the auditing 
profession in its broader social, organisational and regulatory contexts (Humphrey, 2008).  
 The purpose of this research was to better understand the relatively unknown 
experiences of auditors’ current practice in considering “other information” during the audit 
engagement. Auditors were asked for their views and their experiences of current practice, 
making this study the type of research which many authors strongly advocate as being of 
interest to accounting practitioners, shareholders and stake holders (Covaleski et al., 
Gendron, 2000; Humphrey, 2008). This study contributes to the scarce quantity of qualitative 
audit research by eliciting the views and perceptions of current practicing auditors.  
6.3 Contributions to theory 
 A significant contribution derived at by this study is its identification of how issues 
raised in the interviews impact on the “performance gap” and its two components: deficient 
standards and deficient performance defined by (Porter, 1993). By utilising the “performance 
gap” as a framework for this study, it allows us to identify specific responsibilities that 
contribute to deficient standards and deficient performance and thus, provide a basis for 
recommendations for addressing the issues contributing to the gap. Furthermore, it confirms 
its usefulness as an analytical framework (Fisher & Naylor, 2016).  
6.4 Contributions to practice and policy 
6.4.1 Contributions to practice 
 The interview findings from this study focus the attention on current practices in the 
audit of the “other information”. An important concern arising from the review of ISA 720 is 
the subjectivity contained within the standard. The interview findings confirm this 
subjectivity which may be the most fundamental factor impairing the auditor’s ability to 
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effectively consider “other information”. The conclusion reached was that the revised 
standard may, as a result of ambiguity, expose auditors to potential liability. 
 The interview findings provide evidence concerning current practice and requirements 
regarding auditors’ consideration of “other information”. The results shed light onto auditors’ 
practices. If auditors are perceived as being under-responsive towards “other information” the 
profession may potentially face criticisms and litigation.  
6.4.2 Contributions to policy 
 Utilising the “performance gap” as an analytical framework, allowed us to identify 
specific responsibilities and provide a basis for recommendations. Deficient standards may be 
addressed by introducing new auditing requirements to embrace the responsibilities that are 
cost-effective for auditors to perform to assist in narrowing this gap (Porter, 2004). In relation 
to ISA 720, auditors are currently doing more than what is required in certain areas, which 
suggests that these areas should be codified into standards. However, as mentioned in 
Chapter 5, the articulation of existing practices has drawn criticisms to the profession 
(Humphrey & Moizer, 1990). 
 The deficient performance may be narrowed through the introduction of more 
guidance in ISA 720 to provide a basis of comparison between auditors and the “other 
information”. This will reduce the level of current subjectivity within ISA 720. In addition, 
Porter (2004) suggests more rigorous monitoring of auditors’ performance, improved quality 
controls within audit firms, and enhanced education for all auditors. This should, in time, 
result in improved actual and perceived performance by auditors (Porter, 2004) thereby, 
narrowing the deficient performance portion of the performance gap.  
6.5 Recommendations for future research  
 Due to the scope of this study, the views of senior auditors and their perception of the 
“other information” were elicited. In conducting the interviews, several interviewees noted 
the impact regulatory bodies such as the FMA, had on management in preparing the “other 
information”. An extension of this study could elicit views of regulators in relation to their 
expectations and importance on the “other information”.  
 There is scant literature on how auditors audit the “other information” during the audit 
of the financial statements. This then makes this research an exploratory study and suggests 
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this study could be replicated by others to determine whether the conclusions derived in this 
study are generalisable.   
 An area of difficulty in the interview findings was the lack of guidance given to 
auditors in the absence of material inconsistencies between the “other information” and the 
audited financial statements. Auditors had to refer to standards and guidelines outside the ISA 
to influence management. Thus, future research could therefore investigate in more detail 
how auditors respond to disagreements with management regarding the “tone” of the message 
and assess the responsiveness of management such as, strategy.  
6.6 Concluding remarks 
 The current literature with the research findings, addressed a gap in knowledge 
relating to auditor’s role in auditing “other information” in annual reports. It has made an 
important contribution in examining the practices of auditors in New Zealand by eliciting 
their views on the issues and concerns they face in current practice. The findings reveal 
interesting aspects of practice in the audit with regard to “other information”, as well as 
offering reflections on the significance of ISA 720, both current and revised versions, for the 
audit profession in New Zealand. The findings raise issues regarding an auditor’s roles and 
responsibilities with respect to “other information” and the ongoing-challenges-they face in 
balancing the expectations of society — as reflected by standard setters — and the 





Abrahamson, E., & Amir, E. (1996). The information content of the president's letter to 
shareholders. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 23(8), 1157-1182. 
Aerts, W. (1994). On the use of accounting logic as an explanatory category in narrative 
accounting disclosures. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 19(4-5), 337-353. 
Aerts, W. (2005). Picking up the pieces: impression management in the retrospective 
attributional framing of accounting outcomes.Accounting, organizations and 
society, 30(6), 493-517. 
Akinbuli, S. F. (2010). „The Effect of Audit Expectation Gap on the Work of Auditors, the 
Profession and Users of Financial Information‟.The Nigerian Accountant, 43(4), 37-
47. 
Alvesson, M. (2003). Beyond neopositivists, romantics, and localists: A reflexive approach to 
interviews in organizational research. Academy of management review, 28(1), 13-33. 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants. (2015). AU-C Section 720 Other 
Information in Documents Containing Audited Financial Statements. Retrieved from 
http://www.aicpa.org/research/standards/auditattest/downloadabledocuments/au-c-
00720.pdf 
Archambault, J. L., & Gibson, K. M. (1999). Audited financial statements and the World 
Wide Web. The CPA Journal, 69(11), 52. 
Arnold, V., Bedard, J. C., Phillips, J., & Sutton, S. G. (2011). Enhancing the MD&A for 
Professional and Nonprofessional Investors. Working paper, University of Central 
Florida. 
Arunachalam, V., Pei, B. K., & Steinbart, P. J. (2002). Impression management with graphs: 
Effects on choices. Journal of Information Systems, 16(2), 183-202 
Baker, C. R. (2004, July). What do we mean by accounting for the public interest. In 4th Asia 
Pacific Interdisciplinary Research in Accounting Conference (4-6 July), Singapore. 
Bartlett, S. A., & Chandler, R. A. (1997). The corporate report and the private shareholder: 
Lee and Tweedie twenty years on. The British Accounting Review, 29(3), 245-261. 
Beattie, V., & Jones, M. J. (1992). The use and abuse of graphs in annual reports: theoretical 
framework and empirical study. Accounting and Business Research, 22(88), 291-303. 
Beattie, V., & Jones, M. J. (1997). A Comparitive Study of the Use of Financial Graphs in the 
Corporate Annual Reports of Major US and UK Companies. Journal of International 
Financial Management & Accounting, 8(1), 33-68. 
72 
 
Beattie, V., & Jones, M. J. (2000). Impression management: the case of inter-country 
financial graphs. Journal of International Accounting, Auditing and Taxation, 9(2), 
159-183. 
Beattie, V., & Jones, M. J. (2002). Measurement distortion of graphs in corporate reports: an 
experimental study. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, 15(4), 546-564. 
Beattie, V., & Jones, M. J. (2008). Corporate reporting using graphs: A review and 
synthesis. Journal of Accounting Literature, 27, 71. 
Beattie, V., Fearnley, S., & Brandt, R. (2001).Behind closed doors. New York, NY: Palgrave. 
Beattie, V., McInnes, B., & Fearnley, S. (2004). Through the eyes of management: Narrative 
reporting across three sectors. Final Report. ICAEW Centre for Business 
Performance, London. 
Bedard, J. C., Sutton, S. G., Arnold, V., & Phillips, J. R. (2012). Another piece of the 
“expectations gap”: What do investors know about auditor involvement with 
information in the annual report?.Current Issues in Auditing, 6(1), A17-A30. 
Bettman, J. R., & Weitz, B. A. (1983). Attributions in the board room: Causal reasoning in 
corporate annual reports. Administrative science quarterly, 165-183. 
Beynon, M. J., Clatworthy, M. A., & Jones, M. J. (2004). The prediction of profitability using 
accounting narratives: a variable‐precision rough set approach. Intelligent Systems in 
Accounting, Finance and Management,12(4), 227-242. 
Bogdan, R., & Biklen, S. K. (1982). Qualitative research for education. Boston: Allyn & 
Bacon. 
Botosan, C. A. (1997). Disclosure level and the cost of equity capital.Accounting review, 
323-349. 
Bouwman, M. (1982). The use of accounting information: Expert versus novice 
behavior. Decision making: An interdisciplinary inquiry, 134-167. 
Brazel, J. F., Jones, K. L., & Zimbelman, M. F. (2009). Using nonfinancial measures to 
assess fraud risk. Journal of Accounting Research, 47(5), 1135-1166. 
Bryan, S. H. (1997). Incremental information content of required disclosures contained in 
management discussion and analysis. Accounting Review, 285-301. 
Bryman, A., & Bell, E. (2011). Business research methods. Oxford University Press, USA. 
Busco, C., Frigo, M. L., Quattrone, P., & Riccaboni, A. (2013). Integrated reporting.Concepts 
and Cases that Redefine Corporate. 
Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants. (1999). The impact of technology on financial 
and business reporting. Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants. 
73 
 
Canniffe, M. (2003). Annual reports. Dublin: Institute of Chartered Accountants In Ireland. 
Carmichael, D. R. (1995). The Audit Agenda.Accounting Horizons, 9(4), 143. 
Cassell, C., & Symon, G. (1994). Qualitative research in work contexts. Qualitative methods 
in organizational research: A practical guide, 1-13. 
Clarkson, P. M., Kao, J. L., & Richardson, G. D. (1999). Evidence that management 
discussion and analysis (MD&A) is a part of a firm's overall disclosure 
package. Contemporary accounting research, 16(1), 111-134. 
Clatworthy, M. A., & Jones, M. J. (2006). Differential patterns of textual characteristics and 
company performance in the chairman's statement. Accounting, Auditing & 
Accountability Journal, 19(4), 493-511. 
Clatworthy, M., & Jones, M. J. (2003). Financial reporting of good news and bad news: 
evidence from accounting narratives. Accounting and business research, 33(3), 171-
185. 
Cole, C. J., & Jones, C. L. (2005). Management discussion and analysis: A review and 
implications for future research. Journal of Accounting Literature, 24, 135. 
Deegan, C., & Gordon, B. (1996). A study of the environmental disclosure practices of 
Australian corporations. Accounting and business research,26(3), 187-199. 
Dolan, A., & Ayland, C. (2001). Analysis on trial.International Journal of Market 
Research, 43(4), 377. 
Eccles, R. G., & Krzus, M. P. (2010). One report: Integrated reporting for a sustainable 
strategy. John Wiley & Sons. 
Epstein, M. J., & Geiger, M. A. (1994). Investor views of audit assurance: Recent evidence of 
the e. Journal of Accountancy, 177(1), 60. 
Epstein, M. J., & Palepu, K. G. (1999). What financial analysts want. Strategic 
Finance, 80(10), 48 
Epstein, M. J., & Pava, M. L. (1995). Shareholders' perceptions on the usefulness of 
MD&As. Managerial Finance, 21(3), 68-83. 









External Reporting Board [XRB]. (2011, June). International Standard on Auditing (New 
Zealand) 720 The Auditor’s Responsibilities Relating to Other Information in 
Documents Containing Audited Financial Statements (ISA (NZ) 720). 
Retrieved August 23, 2016, from 
https://xrb.govt.nz/Site/Auditing_Assurance_Standards/Current_Standards/Auditing_
Standards/default.aspx 
Fisher, R. T., & Naylor, S. T. (2016). Corporate reporting on the Internet and the expectations 
gap: new face of an old problem. Accounting and Business Research, 46(2), 196-220. 
Fisher, R., Oyelere, P., & Laswad, F. (2004). Corporate reporting on the Internet: Audit 
issues and content analysis of practices. Managerial Auditing Journal, 19(3), 412-439. 
Flint, D. (1988). Philosophy and principles of auditing: an introduction. Macmillan 
Education. 
Gaa, J. C. (1991). The expectations game: regulation of auditors by government and the 
profession. Critical Perspectives on Accounting, 2(1), 83-107. 
Gendron, Y. (2000). Openness to context-based research: the gulf between the claims and 
actions of Big Six firms in the USA. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability 
Journal, 13(2), 175-196. 
Ghauri, P. N., & Grønhaug, K. (2005). Research methods in business studies: A practical 
guide. Pearson Education. 
Gowthorpe, C., & Flynn, G. (1997). Reporting on the Web: The state of the art. Accountancy: 
International Edition, 120(1248), 58-59. 
Gray, R., McPhail, K., Collison, D. J., French, J., & Stevenson, L. (2001). The professional 
accountancy bodies and the provision of education and training in relation to 
environmental issues. Institute of Chartered Accountants of Scotland. 
Groves, R. J. (1994). Financial disclosure: When more is not better.Financial 
Executive, 10(3), 11-15. 
Gulliford, J., Hussey, R., & Lymer, A. (1998). Corporate Communications: Financial 
Reporting on the Internet. Deloitte & Touche. 
Haniffa, R., & Hudaib, M. (2007). Locating audit expectations gap within a cultural context: 
The case of Saudi Arabia. Journal of International Accounting, Auditing and 
Taxation, 16(2), 179-206. 
Hanks, J., & Gardiner, L. (2012). Integrated reporting: lessons from the South African 
experience (No. 11052). The World Bank. 
Hanks, J., & Gardiner, L. (2012). Integrated reporting: lessons from the South African 
experience (No. 11052). The World Bank. 
75 
 
Harte, G., Lewis, L., & Owen, D. (1991). Ethical investment and the corporate reporting 
function.Critical Perspectives on Accounting, 2(3), 227-253. 
Hassink, H. F., Bollen, L. H., Meuwissen, R. H., & de Vries, M. J. (2009). Corporate fraud 
and the audit expectations gap: A study among business managers. Journal of 
International Accounting, Auditing and Taxation, 18(2), 85-100. 
Hayes, T., & Mattimoe, R. (2004). To tape or not to tape: reflections on methods of data 
collection. THE REAL LIFE GUIDE TO ACCOUNTING RESEARCH, 359. 
Henderson, D. (2004). The role of business in the modern world. London: Institute of 
Economic Affairs. 
Higson, A. (2003). Corporate financial reporting: Theory and practice. Sage. 
Hodge, F. D. (2001). Hyperlinking unaudited information to audited financial statements: 
Effects on investor judgments. The Accounting Review, 76(4), 675-691. 
Holmes, N. (1984). Designer's guide to creating charts & diagrams. Watson-Guptill. 
Hooks, J., Coy, D., & Davey, H. (2002). The information gap in annual reports. Accounting, 
Auditing & Accountability Journal, 15(4), 501-522. 
Hopwood, A. (1996). Probing further into auditing and its consequences - 
introduction. Accounting Organizations and Society, 21(2-3), 217-218. 
Horton, J., Macve, R., & Struyven, G. (2004). Qualitative research: experiences in using 
semi-structured interviews. The real life guide to accounting research, 339-357. 
Huberman, A. M., & Miles, M. B. (1994). Data management and analysis methods. 
Humphrey, C. (2008). Auditing research: A review across the disciplinary 
divide. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, 21(2), 170-203. 
Humphrey, C., & Moizer, P. (1990). From techniques to ideologies: An alternative 
perspective on the audit function. Critical Perspectives on Accounting, 1(3), 217-238. 
Humphrey, C., O’Dwyer, B., & Unerman, J. (2014). The Rise of Integrated Reporting: 
Understanding Attempts to Institutionalize a New Reporting Framework. Centre for 
Social & Environmental Accounting Research (CSEAR), St Andrews. 
Institute of Chatered Accountants in England and Wales [ICAEW]. (2004). The Operating 
and Financial Review: Comments on the Draft Regulations. Technical Release 31/04. 
London: Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales 
Ingram, R. W., & Frazier, K. B. (1983). Narrative disclosures in annual reports. Journal of 
Business Research, 11(1), 49-60. 
76 
 
Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales [ICAEW]. (2016, May 8). 
Enhanced business review. Retrieved from http://www.icaew.com/en/technical/legal-
and-regulatory/company-law/enhanced-business-review 
International Accounting Stanards Board [IASB]. (2006). Comment letters on the discussion 
paper: Management Commentary, at www.iasb.org.uk 
International Accounting Standards Board [IASB]. (2015). At  a glance: ISA 720 (Revised), 
The Auditor’s Responsibilities Relating to Other Information. Retrieved from 
http://www.kacr.cz/file/2226/isa-720-revised-at-a-glance.pdf 
International Auditing and Assurance Board [IAASB]. (2015, April). International Standard 
on Auditing (ISA) 720 (Revised), The Auditor’s Responsibilities Relating to Other 
Information | IFAC. Retrieved August 23, 2016, from 
https://www.ifac.org/publications-resources/international-standard-auditing-isa-720-
revised-auditor-s-responsibilities--0 
International Auditing and Assurance Board [IAASB]. (2012). International Standard on 
Auditing (ISA) 720 (Revised) The Auditor’s Responsibilities Relating to Other 
Information in Documents Containing or Accompanying Audited Financial 
Statements and the Auditor’s Report Thereon Proposed Consequential and 
Conforming Amendments to Other ISAs. Retrieved from 
https://www.ifac.org/system/files/publications/files/ISA-720-The-Auditor%27s-
Responsibilities-Relating-to-Other-Information-in-Documents.pdf 
International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board [IAASB]. (2016). Integrated 
Reporting Working Group - Supporting Credibility and Trust in Emerging Forms of 
External Reporting: Ten Key Challenges for Assurance Engagements. Retrieved from 
https://www.ifac.org/system/files/publications/files/IAASB-Discussion-Paper-
Integrated-Reporting_0.pdf 
International Federation of Accountants [IFAC]. (2015, April 8). IAASB’s Revised Standard 
ISA 720 Enhances Auditor Focus on Annual Reports in Light of Increased Investor 
Focus on Qualitative Disclosures. Retrieved from https://www.ifac.org/news-
events/2015-04/iaasb-s-revised-standard-isa-720-enhances-auditor-focus-annual-
reports-light-inc 
Jennings, M., Kneer, D. C., & Reckers, P. J. (1993). The Significance of Audit Decision Aids 
and Precase Jurists' Attitudes on Perceptions of Audit Firm Culpability and 
Liability. Contemporary Accounting Research, 9(2), 489-507. 
Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency 
costs and ownership structure. Journal of financial economics, 3(4), 305-360. 
Jones, M. J. (2011). Creative accounting, fraud and international accounting scandals. John 
Wiley & Sons. 
77 
 
Jones, M. J., & Xiao, J. Z. (2004, September). Financial reporting on the Internet by 2010: a 
consensus view. In Accounting forum (Vol. 28, No. 3, pp. 237-263). Elsevier. 
Knox, S., & Burkard, A. W. (2009). Qualitative research interviews. Psychotherapy 
Research,19(4-5), 566-575. 
Lee, T. A., & Tweedie, D. P. (1976). The private shareholder: his sources of financial 
information and his understanding of reporting practices.Accounting and business 
research, 6(24), 304-314. 
Lee., T. A. (1986). Company Auditing. Wokingham: Van Nostrand Reinhold (UK). 
Libby, R., Nelson, M. W., & Hunton, J. E. (2006). Retracted: Recognition v. Disclosure, 
Auditor Tolerance for Misstatement, and the Reliability of Stock‐Compensation and 
Lease Information.Journal of Accounting Research, 44(3), 533-560. 
Lincoln, Y. S., & Guba, E. G. (1985). Naturalistic inquiry (Vol. 75). Sage. 
Maines, L. A., & McDaniel, L. S. (2000). Effects of comprehensive-income characteristics on 
nonprofessional investors' judgments: The role of financial-statement presentation 
format. The accounting review, 75(2), 179-207. 
Manson, S., & Zaman, M. (1999, March). Lobbying the Auditing Practices Board: Analysis 
of responses to the expanded audit report. InAccounting Forum (Vol. 23, No. 1, pp. 
11-34). Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 
McEnroe, J. E., & Martens, S. C. (1998). An examination of the auditing standards 
promulgation process involving SAS No. 69.Journal of Accounting and Public 
Policy, 17(1), 1-26. 
McEnroe, J. E., & Martens, S. C. (2001). Auditors' and investors' perceptions of the 
“expectation gap”. Accounting Horizons, 15(4), 345-358. 
McKerchar, M. A. (2010). Design and conduct of research in tax, law and accounting. 
Sydney, N.S.W: Thomson Reuters/Lawbook Co. 
Merkl-Davies, D. M., & Brennan, N. M. (2007). Discretionary disclosure strategies in 
corporate narratives: incremental information or impression management?. Journal of 
accounting literature, 27, 116-196. 
Messier, W. F. (1983). The effect of experience and firm type on materiality/disclosure 
judgments.Journal of Accounting Research, 611-618. 
Monroe, G. S., & Woodliff, D. R. (1994). An empirical investigation of the audit expectation 
gap: Australian evidence. Accounting & Finance,34(1), 47-74. 
Nazri Fadzly, M., & Ahmad, Z. (2004). Audit expectation gap: The case of 
Malaysia.Managerial Auditing Journal, 19(7), 897-915. 
78 
 
New Zealand Institute of Chartered Accountants. (2010). International Standards on Auditing 
(ISA) Implementation in New Zealand. Retrieved from New Zealand Institute of 
Chartered Accountants website: file:///F:/ISA_Implementation_May2010.pdf 
Paivio, A., & Begg, I. (1974). Pictures and words in visual search. Memory & 
Cognition, 2(3), 515-521. 
Patton, M. Q. (1990). Qualitative evaluation and research methods . SAGE Publications, inc. 
Patton, M. Q. (2002). Qualitative evaluation and research methods . SAGE Publications, inc. 
Percy, J. P. (1999). Assurance Services—Visions for the Future. International Journal of 
Auditing,3(2), 81-87. 
Polkinghorne, D. E. (1994). Reaction to special section on qualitative research in counseling 
process and outcome. Journal of Counseling Psychology, 41(4), 510. 
Pong, C., & Whittington, G. (1994). The working of the auditing practices committee—three 
case studies. Accounting and business research,24(94), 157-175. 
Porter, B. (1993). An empirical study of the audit expectation-performance gap. Accounting 
and business research, 24(93), 49-68. 
Porter, B. A., & Gowthorpe, C. (2001, March). The audit expectation–performance gap: 
Some new evidence from the United Kingdom. In National Auditing Conference, 
Leicester. UK: University of Leicester. 
Porter, B., & Gowthorpe, C. (2004). Audit expectation-performance gap in the United 
Kingdom in 1999 and comparison with the Gap in New Zealand in 1989 and in 1999. 
Institute of Chartered Accountants of Scotland. 
Porter, B., Ó hÓgartaigh, C., & Baskerville, R. (2012). Audit Expectation‐Performance Gap 
Revisited: Evidence from New Zealand and the United Kingdom. Part 1: The Gap in 
New Zealand and the United Kingdom in 2008. International Journal of 
Auditing, 16(2), 101-129. 
Power, M. (1997). The audit society: Rituals of verification. OUP Oxford. 
Power, M. K. (2003). Auditing and the production of legitimacy. Accounting, organizations 
and society, 28(4), 379-394. 
Qu, S. Q., & Dumay, J. (2011). The qualitative research interview. Qualitative Research in 
Accounting & Management, 8(3), 238-264. 
Rallis, S. F., & Rossman, G. B. (2012). Learning in the field: An introduction to qualitative 
research. 
Richardson, A. J., & Dowling, J. B. (1986). An integrative theory of organizational 
legitimation.Scandinavian Journal of Management Studies,3(2), 91-109. 
79 
 
Rogers, R. K., & Grant, J. (1997). Content analysis of information cited in reports of sell-side 
financial analysts (digest summary). J Financ Statement Anal, 3(1), 17-30. 
Rutherford, B. A. (2003). Obfuscation, textual complexity and the role of regulated narrative 
accounting disclosure in corporate governance.Journal of management and 
governance, 7(2), 187-210. 
Salehi, M. (2011). Audit expectation gap: Concept, nature and trace. African Journal of 
Business Management, 5(21), 8376-8392. 
Schwandt, T. A. (2001). Dictionary of qualitative research. 
Securities Exchange Commission. (2002, January 16). SEC Interpretation: Management's 
Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations; Certain 
Investment Company Disclosures. Retrieved from 
https://www.sec.gov/rules/interp/33-6835.htm 
Securities Exchange Commission. (2003, December 19). Interpretation: Commission 
Guidance Regarding Management's Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition 
and Results of Operations. Retrieved from https://www.sec.gov/rules/interp/33-
8350.htm 
Seidman, I. (2006). Interviewing as qualitative research: A guide for researchers in education 
and the social sciences(3rd ed.). New York: Teachers College Press. 
Shuy, R. W. (2003). In-person versus telephone interviewing. Inside interviewing: New 
lenses, new concerns, 175-193. 
Sikka, P. (1992). Audit policy making in the UK: The case of ‘the auditor's considerations in 
respect of going concern’. European accounting review, 1(2), 349-392. 
Sikka, P. (2001). Regulation of accountancy and the power of capital: some 
observations. Critical Perspectives on Accounting, 12(2), 199-211. 
Sikka, P., Puxty, A., Willmott, H., & Cooper, C. (1998). The impossibility of eliminating the 
expectations gap: Some theory and evidence. Critical Perspectives on 
Accounting, 9(3), 299-330. 
Sikka, P., Willmott, H., & Lowe, T. (1989). Guardians of Knowledge and Public Interest: 
Evidence and Issues of Accountability in the UK Accountancy 
Profession. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, 2(2). 
Simnett, R., & Huggins, A. (2014). Enhancing the auditor's report: to what extent is there 
support for the IAASB's proposed changes?. Accounting Horizons, 28(4), 719-747. 
Sinkovics, R. R., & Ghauri, P. N. (2008). Enhancing the trustworthiness of qualitative 
research in international business. Management International Review, 48(6), 689-714. 
80 
 
Smith, M., & Taffler, R. (1992). Readability and understandability: Different measures of the 
textual complexity of accounting narrative. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability 
Journal, 5(4). 
Smith, M., & Taffler, R. (1995). The incremental effect of narrative accounting information 
in corporate annual reports. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 22(8), 1195-
1210. 
Smith, M., & Taffler, R. J. (2000). The chairman's statement-A content analysis of 
discretionary narrative disclosures. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability 
Journal, 13(5), 624-647. 
Stanton, P., Stanton, J., & Pires, G. (2004). Impressions of an annual report: an experimental 
study. Corporate Communications: An International Journal,9(1), 57-69. 
Staw, B. M., McKechnie, P. I., & Puffer, S. M. (1983). The justification of organizational 
performance. Administrative science quarterly, 582-600. 
Steinbart, P. J. (1989). The auditor’s responsibility for the accuracy of graphs in annual 
reports: some evidence of the need for additional guidance.Accounting 
Horizons, 3(3), 60-70. 
Sutton, S. G., Arnold, V., Bedard, J. C., & Phillips, J. R. (2012). Enhancing and structuring 
the MD&A to aid investors when using interactive data.Journal of Information 
Systems, 26(2), 167-188. 
Tavcar, L. R. (1998). Make the MD&A more readable. The CPA Journal, 68(1), 10. 
Taylor, S. J., & Bogdan, R. (1984). Introduction to qualitative research methods: The search 
for meaning. 
Taylor, S. J., & Bogdan, R. (1998). Introduction to qualitative research methods: A 
guidebook and resources (3rd ed.). New York: John Wiley & Sons 
Teixeira, A., Buchheim, R., Hicks, C., Lingwood, J., Loweth, D., & Willis, A. (2005). 
Management commentary. 
Tennyson, B. M., Ingram, R. W., & Dugan, M. T. (1990). Assessing the information content 
of narrative disclosures in explaining bankruptcy. Journal of Business Finance & 
Accounting, 17(3), 391-410. 
Thomas, E., & Magilvy, J. K. (2011). Qualitative rigor or research validity in qualitative 
research.Journal for specialists in pediatric nursing, 16(2), 151-155. 




Van Peursem, K. A., Locke, J., & Harnisch, N. (2006). Going concern guidance for New 
Zealand auditors: transitions in communicative acts.Critical Perspectives on 
Accounting, 17(1), 109-137. 
Wagenhofer, A. (2003). Economic consequences of internet financial 
reporting. Schmalenbach Business Review, 55, 262-279. 
Wheeler, S. W., Cereola, S. J., & Louwers, T. J. (2014). MD&A disclosure tendencies: The 
case of LIFO liquidations. Accounting Horizons, 28(4), 805-818. 
Wild, S., & van Staden, C. (2013, July). Integrated reporting: initial analysis of early 
reporters–an institutional theory approach. In 7th Asia Pacific Interdisciplinary 
Accounting Research Conference(pp. 26-28). 
Young, J. J. (2003). Constructing, persuading and silencing: the rhetoric of accounting 
standards.Accounting, Organizations and Society, 28(6), 621-638. 





Appendix 1: Comparison of ISA 720 and ISA 720 (revised) 
COMPARISON OF ISA 720 AND ISA 720 (REVISED) 
ISA 720 ISA 720 (revised) 
Scope  
1. This International Standard on Auditing 
(New Zealand) (ISA (NZ)) deals with 
the auditor’s responsibilities relating to 
other information in documents 
containing audited financial statements 
and the auditor’s report thereon. In the 
absence of any separate requirement in 
the particular circumstances of the 
engagement, the auditor’s opinion does 
not cover other information and the 
auditor has no specific responsibility for 
determining whether or not other 
information is properly stated. However, 
the auditor reads the other information 
because the credibility of the audited 
financial statements may be undermined 
by material inconsistencies between the 
audited financial statements and other 
information.  
 
2. In this ISA (NZ) “documents containing 
audited financial statements” refers to 
annual reports (or similar documents), 
that are issued to owners (or similar 
stakeholders), containing audited 
financial statements and the auditor’s 
report thereon. This ISA (NZ) may also 
be applied, adapted as necessary in the 
circumstances, to other documents 
containing audited financial statements, 
such as those used in securities offerings. 
 
1. This International Standard on Auditing 
(ISA) deals with the auditor’s 
responsibilities relating to other information, 
whether financial or non-financial 
information (other than financial statements 
and the auditor’s report thereon), included in 
an entity’s annual report. An entity’s annual 
report may be a single document or a 
combination of documents that serve the 
same purpose. 
 
 2. … The auditor’s opinion on the financial 
statements does not cover the other 
information, nor does this ISA require the 
auditor to obtain audit evidence beyond that 
required to form an opinion on the financial 
statements.  
 
3. This ISA requires the auditor to read and 
consider the other information because other 
information that is materially inconsistent 
with the financial statements or the auditor’s 
knowledge obtained in the audit may 
indicate that there is a material misstatement 
of the financial statements or that a material 
misstatement of the other information exists, 
either of which may undermine the 
credibility of the financial statements and 
the auditor’s report thereon. Such material 
misstatements may also inappropriately 
influence the economic decisions of the 
users for whom the auditor’s report is 
prepared.  
 
5. Other information may include amounts or 
other items that are intended to be the same 
as, to summarize, or to provide greater 
detail, about amounts or other items in the 
financial statements, and other amounts or 
other items about which the auditor has 
obtained knowledge in the audit. Other 
information may also include other matters.  
 
6. The auditor’s responsibilities relating to 
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other information (other than applicable 
reporting responsibilities) apply regardless 
of whether the other information is obtained 
by the auditor prior to, or after, the date of 
the auditor’s report.  
8. The auditor’s responsibilities under this ISA 
do not constitute an assurance engagement 
on other information or impose an 
obligation on the auditor to obtain assurance 
about the other information. 
Objective  
4.  The objective of the auditor is to 
respond appropriately when documents 
contained audited financial statements 
and the auditor’s report thereon include 
“other information” that could 
undermine the credibility of those 
financial statements and the auditor’s 
report. 
11. The objectives of the auditor, having read 
the other information, are: 
 
(a) To consider whether there is a material 
inconsistency between the other 
information and the financial statements;  
 
(b) To consider whether there is a material 
inconsistency between the other 
information and the auditor’s knowledge 
obtained in the audit;  
 
(c) To respond appropriately when the 
auditor identifies that such material 
inconsistencies appear to exist, or when the 
auditor otherwise becomes aware that other 
information appears to be materially 
misstated; and  
 
(d) To report in accordance with this ISA 
Definitions  
5. For the purposes of the ISAs the 
following terms have the meanings 
attributed below: 
 
(a) Other information – Financial and 
non-financial information (other than the 
financial statements and the auditor’s 
report thereon) which is included, either 
by law, regulation or custom, in a 
document containing audited financial 
statements and the auditor’s report 
thereon 
 
(b) Inconsistency – Other information 
that contradicts information contained in 
the audit financial statements. A material 
inconsistency may raise doubt about the 
audit conclusions drawn from audit 
12. For purposes of the ISAs, the following 
terms have the meanings attributed below: 
 
(a) Annual report – A document, or 
combination of documents, prepared 
typically on an annual basis by 
management or those charged with 
governance in accordance with law, 
regulation or custom, the purpose of which 
is to provide owners (or similar 
stakeholders) with information on the 
entity’s operations and the entity’s financial 
results and financial position as set out in 
the financial statements. An annual report 
contains or accompanies the financial 
statements and the auditor’s report thereon 
and usually includes information about the 
entity’s developments, its future outlook 
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evidence previously obtained and, 
possibly, about the basis for the auditor’s 
opinion on the financial statements 
 
(c) Misstatement of fact – Other 
information that is unrelated to matters 
appearing in the audited financial 
statements that is incorrectly stated or 
presented. A material misstatement of 
fact may undermine the credibility of the 
document containing audited financial 
statements. 
and risks and uncertainties, a statement by 
the entity’s governing body, and reports 
covering governance matters 
 
(b) Misstatement of the other 
information – A misstatement of the other 
information exists when the other 
information is incorrectly stated or [is] 
otherwise misleading (including because it 
omits or obscures information necessary for 
a proper understanding of a matter 
disclosed in the other information) 
 
(c) Other information – Financial or non-
financial information (other than financial 
statements and the auditor’s report thereon) 
included in an entity’s annual report 
Requirements  
Obtaining the “other information”  
6. The auditor shall read the other 
information to identify material 
inconsistencies, if any, with the audited 
financial statements. 
 
7. The auditor shall make appropriate 
arrangements with management or those 
charged with governance to obtain the 
other information prior to the date of the 
auditor’s report. If it is not possible to 
obtain all the other information prior to 
the date of the auditor’s report, the 
auditor shall read such other information 
as soon as practicable 
13. The auditor shall:  
 
(a) Determine, through discussion with 
management, which document(s) 
comprises the annual report, and the 
entity’s planned manner and timing of the 
issuance of such document(s);  
 
(b) Make appropriate arrangements with 
management to obtain in a timely manner 
and, if possible, prior to the date of the 
auditor’s report, the final version of the 
document(s) comprising the annual report; 
and  
 
(c) When some or all of the document(s) 
determined in (a) will not be available until 
after the date of the auditor’s report, 
request management to provide a written 
representation that the final version of the 
document(s) will be provided to the auditor 
when available, and prior to its issuance by 
the entity, such that the auditor can 
complete the procedures required by this 
ISA 
Material inconsistencies  
8. If, on reading the other information, the 
auditor identifies a material 
inconsistency, the auditor shall 
determine whether the audited financial 




needs to be revised. 
Material misstatements of fact   
14. If, on reading the other information for 
the purpose of identifying material 
inconsistencies, the auditor becomes 
aware of an apparent material 
misstatement of fact, the auditor shall 
discuss the matter with those charged 
with governance. 
 
Reading and considering the “other 
information” 
 
 14. If the auditor concludes that a material 
misstatement of the other information 
exists, the auditor shall request 
management to correct the other 
information. If management:  
 
(a) Agrees to make the correction, the 
auditor shall determine that the correction 
has been made; or  
 
(b) Refuses to make the correction, the 
auditor shall communicate the matter with 
those charged with governance and request 
that the correction be made.  
 
15. While reading the other information in 
accordance with paragraph 14, the auditor 
shall remain alert for indications that the 
other information not related to the 
financial statements or the auditor’s 
knowledge obtained in the audit appears to 
be materially misstated 
 
18. If the auditor concludes that a material 
misstatement exists in other information 
obtained prior to the date of the auditor’s 
report, and the other information is not 
corrected after communicating with those 
charged with governance, the auditor shall 
take appropriate action, including:  
 
(a) Considering the implications for the 
auditor’s report and communicating with 
those charged with governance about how 
the auditor plans to address the material 
misstatement in the auditor’s report (see 
paragraph 22(e)(ii)); or  
 
(b) Withdrawing from the engagement, 
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where withdrawal is possible under 
applicable law or regulation  
 
19. If the auditor concludes that a material 
misstatement exists in other information 
obtained after the date of the auditor’s 
report, the auditor shall:  
 
(a) If the other information is corrected, 
perform the procedures necessary in the 
circumstances; or  
 
(b) If the other information is not corrected 
after communicating with those charged 
with governance, take appropriate action 
considering the auditor’s legal rights and 
obligations, to seek to have the uncorrected 
material misstatement appropriately 
brought to the attention of users for whom 
the auditor’s report is prepared 
Responding when a material 
misstatement in the financial statements 
exists or the auditor’s understanding of 
the entity and its environment needs to 
be updated 
 
 20. If, as a result of performing the procedures 
in paragraphs 14–15, the auditor concludes 
that a material misstatement in the financial 
statements exists or the auditor’s 
understanding of the entity and its 
environment needs to be updated, the 
auditor shall respond appropriately in 
accordance with the other ISAs 
Reporting  
 21. The auditor’s report shall include a 
separate section with a heading “Other 
Information”, or other appropriate heading, 
when, at the date of the auditor’s report:  
 
(a) For an audit of financial statements of a 
listed entity, the auditor has obtained, or 
expects to obtain, the other information; or  
 
(b) For an audit of financial statements of 
an entity other than a listed entity, the 
auditor has obtained some or all of the other 
information  
 
22. When the auditor’s report is required to 
include an Other Information section in 
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accordance with paragraph 21, this section 
shall include:  
 
(a) A statement that management is 
responsible for the other information;  
 
(b) An identification of:  
 
(i) Other information, if any, obtained 
by the auditor prior to the date of the 
auditor’s report; and  
 
(ii) For an audit of financial statements 
of a listed entity, other information, if 
any, expected to be obtained after the 
date of the auditor’s report;  
 
(c) A statement that the auditor’s opinion 
does not cover the other information and, 
accordingly, that the auditor does not 
express (or will not express) an audit 
opinion or any form of assurance 
conclusion thereon;  
 
(d) A description of the auditor’s 
responsibilities relating to reading, 
considering and reporting on other 
information as required by this ISA; and  
 
(e) When other information has been 
obtained prior to the date of the auditor’s 
report, either:  
 
(i) A statement that the auditor has 
nothing to report; or  
 
(ii) If the auditor has concluded that 
there is an uncorrected material 
misstatement of the other information, 
a statement that describes the 
uncorrected material misstatement of 
the other information.  
 
23. When the auditor expresses a qualified or 
adverse opinion in accordance with ISA 
705 (Revised), 3 the auditor shall consider 
the implications of the matter giving rise to 
the modification of opinion for the 
statement required in paragraph 22(e) 
Reporting prescribed by law or regulation  
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 24. If the auditor is required by law or 
regulation of a specific jurisdiction to refer 
to the other information in the auditor’s 
report using a specific layout or wording, 
the auditor’s report shall refer to 
International Standards on Auditing only if 
the auditor’s report includes, at a minimum:  
 
(a) Identification of the other information 
obtained by the auditor prior to the date of 
the auditor’s report;  
 
(b) A description of the auditor’s 
responsibilities with respect to the other 
information; and  
 
(c) An explicit statement addressing the 
outcome of the auditor’s work for this 
purpose. 
Documentation  
 25. In addressing the requirements of ISA 230 
as it applies to this ISA, the auditor shall 
include in the audit documentation:  
 
(a) Documentation of the procedures 
performed under this ISA; and  
 
(b) The final version of the other 
information on which the auditor has 
performed the work required under this ISA 
Application and Other Explanatory 
Material 
 






Appendix 2: Interview guide 
INTERVIEW GUIDE 
Topic 1: the “other information” 
1. Briefly describe the process you go through in carrying out the audit regarding the 
“other information” 
2. What is the scope of your review of the “other information”?  
3. To what extent do you consult members of the audit team and/or the audit working 
papers before or during your review of the “other information?  Or do you base the 
review on recalled information? 
4. Do you consider Web docs if fs uploaded to web?  Any special considerations for 
web-based situations? 
5. What do you think about graphs, pictures and tables in annual reports? How do they 
affect the audit? 
6. In your experience, how accurate is qualitative information which typically forms part 
of the “other information”? 
Topic 2: ISA 720 
1. What are your duties regarding the “other information? What should they be? 
2. Do you use checklists/standard work programmes?  Can I have a copy? 
3. How do you determine materiality for reviewing the “other information”?  What 
definition of materiality do you use? 
4. What procedures do you undertake? To look for misstatements, inconsistencies, 
omissions? 
5. (Following from above q.) What do you do when you identify such inconsistencies? 
6. Do you consider the complexity of sentences?  
7. What do you believe users perceive auditors to have done in relation to the “other 
information”? 
8. How does the possibility of legal liability affect your approach to the audit?  
9. Do you believe auditors in general are sufficiently competent to do the review of the 
“other information”? 
10. How well do you believe that (all) auditors in general perform the review of the 
“other information”?  
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Topic 3: Future activities 
1. What will be the impact of the new reporting requirements relating to ISA720? On 
users? On auditors? Etc. 
2. What and how will future issues impact on your review of the “other information” 
(e.g., the development of integrated reporting, etc.)? 
 
 
 
